

reserves would then serve as an additional, viable source for EU needs. In my view this would be the best choice for the EU common energy policy, but only if Brussels has the power to stay immune to US and Russian interests.

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### Endnotes—References

1. Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, 'How the Kurds Got Their Way: Economic Cooperation and the Middle East's New Borders', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014.
2. Until 2012, 70 percent of Turkish-Iraqi commercial transactions were concentrated in Kurdistan, although the KRG population represents only 1/6 of the total population of Iraq.
3. Maryam Pashang, 'Ukraine Crisis and the Role of Iran in Europe's Energy Security', *Natural Gas Europe*, 23 March 2014, as well as Thrassy Marketos, 'Iran's Geopolitics in the midst of the US-Russia-China Energy Security Struggle for the Geostrategic Control of Eurasia', *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies*, Vol. 8 No.3, 2009.
4. Iran has raised its oil exports to Asia by 16 percent, to 1.16 million barrels per day (bpd). See, 'New Research Paints Iran as Crimean Winner', *Middle East Oil and Gas*, issue 470.
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard* New York: Basic Books, 1998.


### Comments on 'EU energy geopolitics and the "Turkish route"'

(Critical Response to Thrassy N. Marketos' "EU energy geopolitics and the "Turkish route" ")

At the outset, the author introduces a compelling thesis: the imminent threat of disintegration of states in the Mashreq and Levant might cause one to overlook a phenomenon that could radically transform established patterns of regional interstate relations, yet does not present a challenge to established norms of territorial inviolability: innovations in pragmatic economic cooperation.

However, the remainder of the analysis, while focused on presenting empirical details of how this dynamic is unfolding in contemporary events, is couched in much more familiar geostrategic language that proceeds from the time-honored assumption of zero-sum competition between national interests as an explanatory variable (as demonstrated by the reference to Brzezinski's "Eurasian Balkans" premise).

The author should have done more to demonstrate how the economic-security nexus challenges this assumption in terms of its ability to explain and predict foreign policy



behavior, or in more limited sense, to identify how the emerging interplay between economic stakeholders (Turkey, EU, Russia and Iran) do not indicate conformity with the traditional notions of classical realist *geopolitik*.

- Anonymous

### Editorial Note

We consider Dr. T. N. Marketos' contribution to be a relevant, contemporary topic which may become outdated in some of its particulars if its publication were to be delayed any further.

Additional reviews and comments on the article are welcome and can be sent to [info@ethnogeopolitics.org](mailto:info@ethnogeopolitics.org). These could then be published as Critical Responses in one or more next issues of the journal—in anonymized form if one wishes so. For now, we include here some of the critical comments made by Assistant Editor Nathasja de Vries:

“If Turkey is not the main topic of the second section [Prospects of the “Turkish route”] in the paper and Iran is, Iran needs more prominence in the initial sentences of the section. You could have opened the second sentence with “For example, it is worth noting that”; you could also have restructured the first sentence as “In order to present itself as a reliable alternative to Russian exports to the EU, Ankara can use other sources, such as natural gas imports from Tehran” or something to that effect.

Your observation in the third section of your paper [What's Next?] that “it was decided in the Western capitals that its [Syria's] regime needs to change” seems an important point, supported by the Syrian unrest point made earlier in the same section, but has not been alluded to in the Introduction; the introduction's ‘soft-landing of Sykes-Picot’ would, in fact, give the opposite impression.”

- Caspar ten Dam, Executive Editor & Nathasja de Vries, Assistant Editor