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Scope

The aim of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) is to further the study of and teaching on the cultural, social, ethnic and (geo-)political characteristics, processes and developments in different areas of the world, at universities, institutes and colleges in and outside the Netherlands. The association's peer-reviewed and open-access journal Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics and our new publishing house EGxPress is above all intended to elicit analytic debate by allowing scholars to air their views, perspectives and research findings—with critical responses from others who may hold a different view or research approach. One can submit manuscripts—main articles (peer-reviewed), critical responses (published peer-reviews), short articles and/or book reviews—to info@ethnogeopolitics.org. We charge no fees for any of the submitted and/or published manuscripts. See www.ethnogeopolitics.org about the association's foundation, founding (editorial) board members, aims, activities and publications—and particularly the freely downloadable copies of the journal's issues.
Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics

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*** Call and Guidelines for Contributions ***

Our journal is also ready to receive contributions in Russian, German, Spanish and other non-English languages (though all require English abstracts). The Editorial Board does not apply a strict word limit, but we prefer full-fledged research articles of no more than 10,000 words. We also welcome short analytical articles, book reviews, review essays, and opinion pieces. We charge no fees for any of the submitted and/or published manuscripts. We provide Open Access in accordance with our Creative Common License policy which can be consulted on our website.

Regular contributors may get a guaranteed space in future issues of our journal, with a recognisable header like ‘Dorsey's Column’ for James M. Dorsey’s contributions. It does not necessarily mean that we approve of everything that these contributors may say. The contributors themselves are responsible and accountable for their statements.

Furthermore, we welcome contributions for special issues on common themes, like the one on Human Security in our Winter 2015 issue. Association of EthnoGeoPolitics is willing to (re)publish through or new publishing house EGuPress special issues in book form—and publish monographs and other manuscripts in book form as well.

Research essays—particularly so-called ‘Main Articles’—undergo rigorous peer-review from at least two peer-reviewers. Extensive (book) review essays that have undergone such review as well, are also considered Main Articles.

We welcome and publish open comments i.e. critical responses—particularly those of peer-reviewers—in order to encourage feedback and debate. These responses can be anonymous if their authors wish so. Still, we encourage them to publicise their names under their contributions, as the latter will thus become better citable, referable.
and indexical as sources and publications.

Of course we at the Editorial Board decide whether or not to publish (excerpts from) peer-reviewers’ comments, based on considerations of utility and usefulness for ongoing debate. Thus the absence of published peer-reviews and comments does not mean that these do not exist; thus some peer-reviews are not published because their comments have been addressed by the author in his or her contribution. To reiterate, Main Articles have undergone generally two or more peer-reviews.

The Editorial Board may publish some of the later comments on published contributions as critical responses (maximum 3,000 words) in one or more subsequent issues of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged, separate research articles.

For each submitted manuscript, please supply your full name, academic and/or other professional titles and affiliations, address(es) and other contact details, as well as your research specialisms and any major publications. Please submit these details with your manuscripts at www.ethnogeopolitics.org/contact-2, or to info@ethnogeopolitics.org.

See for more details on the submission process of main articles, critical responses and other manuscripts www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications.

We thus welcome your contributions, ranging from articles to transparent reviews and comments on these articles.
Editorial

Towards a Fair Practice of Academic Publishing: Innovative Practices for Authors and the Audience in the Field of EthnoGeoPolitics and beyond

Babak Rezvani & Caspar ten Dam

One of the main objectives of our journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* (FEGP)—from the present issue onwards in a new, smaller page-size format—is to give a voice to authors in a fair manner. Despite financial hardship, FEGP has managed to remain an open-accessed journal without charging the authors any fees.

The current established practice of academic publishing, and the policies which many publishers and even universities implement, are not very fair to authors; the altmetric and bibliometric systems of performance do not make the situation any better. As a non-profit organisation, the Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics (EGP) opposes the exploitation of scholars and at the same time wants to encourage and facilitate academic research and review papers as well as analytical articles, in many languages, freely available to a broad audience.

The current practice of academic publishing harnessed by bibliometric systems is particularly unfair to scholars whose subject matter has a
smaller audience or whose institute is internationally less renowned, and in general to those who do not speak English as their first language or are bilingual in it at a native level. Counting India within this category of Anglophones, still about two thirds of humanity are no native speakers of English. This is an undeniable fact.

Even though not all publications of EGP are free (such as its book publications through its publishing house *EGxPress*), EGP intends to remain true to its aims of reaching a large audience and fairness for the authors. Large publishing companies usually offer a tiny percentage of incomes to the author as royalties after hundreds of copies are sold. EGP prefers other models and offers a higher percentage of the revenues acquired from the sold copies to the author.

In order to respect author's ownership and at the same time protecting the intellectual properties of EGP and authors both, EGP has a shared Copy Rights policy (see further the recurrent section ‘Call and Guidelines for Contributions’ in our journal’s issues).¹

To reiterate, after submitting an article to FEGP the author shares its copyrights with EGP. EGP may reuse the material freely and the author may do the same after prior notice to EGP and a statement in the new article that it has been published earlier in FEGP or another publication of EGP.

The authors may submit their own earlier published material to FEGP when they have its copyrights or have the permission of the copyrights holder, and should cite the original publication. One reason that we allow this practice is to enable the author to reach a broader audience.
As one of the main goals of FEGP is to encourage and facilitate debate and discussion, we hope to offer a venue for further debate and discussion and hope to receive new perspectives. FEGP publishes also any letters to the editors and short commentaries.

Getting published in FEGP, an open-comment and transparently peer-reviewed journal, reflects the high, thought-provoking quality of the contributions in question. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the author's views and conclusions are endorsed by FEGP's editorial board. Our board thus tries to keep the journal as a politically neutral platform—despite the often highly charged and sensitive subject matter as typical in the emerging field of ethnogeopolitics.

Everyone is entitled to his or her views and may express it on his or her own title. FEGP neither endorses nor takes responsibilities for authors' statements and views. FEGP publishes any article as long as it does not contain rude language, instigate violence or insult people based on their religion, language, ethnicity, skin colour or nationality. The only criteria to be published in FEGP are the quality of arguments in general and the robustness of research methods and results in particular. All articles in FEGP should meet these professional quality standards.

We have to say that we do not oppose bibliometric and altmetric calculations and lists per se. However, we do opine that they do not capture all indices of quality and we find that a better quality may not always be expressed by a higher index.

For example, a paper with a narrower geographic or thematic focus has a smaller audience, which may lead to fewer citations, yet such a paper
is not qualitatively inferior to those with a lot of citations. On the contrary, subjects with narrower focus usually have a smaller audience whose expertise is nevertheless often very high. We already have initiated publishing contributions in languages other than English. All 'main articles' in FEGP are peer-reviewed. Although, we yet have to have more main articles in languages other than English; we do welcome such contributions.

As our readers may notice, we have brought some changes in the layout of our journal and have adjusted it to a size more common for journals and books. A main obvious reason for this reduced layout-size is that it is conducive to purposes of storage and indexing at libraries. Amongst other reasons, this size is more easily readable in tablets—and two pages could be printed on one regular page when one needs a paper print of it. As a progressive journal we would like to take our responsibility in adopting a sustainable mode of development and protection of natural resources.

As we try to enhance our visibility and user friendliness to the reader, we may still bring some further changes to our layout. One advice that we often get is to distinguish clearly between citable and non-citable items, in order to enhance our altmetric and bibliometric indices (and possibly also impact factor). However, in our vision all articles are citable and citing them depends on their usefulness for the argument of the articles and authors that cite them.

Another, practically parallel advice we get is to make distinct sections for peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed articles. Yet we must point
out that the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed articles are already clearly distinguished by the addition of super-titles like ‘Main Article’ atop of these. Another advice is to distinguish sections based on the language of articles. It still remains to be decided whether we will introduce (sub-)sections and reorganize our journal accordingly. Although we are aware of some arguments that such distinctions may enhance readership and citation, we still cannot fully agree with these as solid arguments. Nevertheless, we do not exclude these or any other kinds of reorganisations of our journal in the future, if it happens to enhance FEGP’s visibility, readership and hence reputation.

As said before, becoming more reader friendly is a valid argument to reorganize our journal differently and we welcome any suggestions in this regard—be it visual, organisational or conceptual.

Be that as it may, it remains to be seen if FEGP alone can change the current, all-too-often lopsided, indeed exploitative practices of publication in academia. At least we do our best to change or at least modify these practices towards a fairer system for both authors and the audience. We certainly hope that more journals and publishers—and indeed universities and research institutes—accompany us in this effort.

*Babak Rezvani, Editor-in-Chief & Caspar ten Dam, Executive Editor
September 2019*

Endnote

1. See for more details on the submission process of manuscripts to our journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* the section ‘Call and Guidelines for

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Contributions’ in this and other issues, and www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications.

NB: do you have any comments on the Editorial? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.

Advertisement: an “Expert” cartoon by Caspar ten Dam; see www.ctdamconsultancy.com
Special Article

ويژگی اتئنورژئوپلیتیک

(Characteristics of EthnoGeoPolitics)

بابک رضوئی (Babak Rezvani)

Abstract in English This article introduces the (sub-)field of ethnogeopolitics. Although there is no consensus about the scope and meaning of geopolitics, an operational definition could be sought at the intersection of geography and politics or political science. Therefore, we can tentatively assume that when cultural factors are taken into analyses, a kind of geopolitics may be ‘produced’ that may be called ethnogeopolitics. Ethnogeopolitical analyses are often multi-scale and multi-actor.

It is not the scope of this article to indicate whether geopolitics and political geography are synonymous. However, certain types of geopolitics exist in the current authoritative typologies of geopolitics: so Classical Geopolitics is regarded as different from Critical Geopolitics. The similarity between ethnogeopolitics and other types of geopolitics remains to be elaborated as this field is still developing.

One of the scopes of the new Persian section in Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics is translation of terminology from and to Persian. Regarding its geographical situation and the history of political geography and geopolitics in Iran, Persian language studies and concepts used in them can enrich our knowledge.

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Key Words: Political Geography, Ethnogeopolitics, Geopolitics, Classical Geopolitics, Critical Geopolitics, Politics, Persian.

گلید واره‌ها: رئولیتیک، رئولیتیک سنی، رئولیتیک انتقایی، سیاست، جغرافیا، علوم سیاسی، روابط بین الملل، جغرافیای سیاسی

انتروژئولیتیک مفهوم جدیدی است که نشان دهنده یک حوزه تحقیقاتی جدید رشته ای است. 1 تعريف و حوزه مطالعاتی آن بستگی به رشته‌های مرتبط با آن به ویژه رئولیتیک دارد. هیچ اجماعی نکه درباره تعريف رئولیتیک و سیاست قومیتی وجود ندارد و این رو انتروژئولیتیک نیز نمی‌تواند به سادگی تعريف شود. برای این که بتوان انتروژئولیتیک را به عنوان رشته‌ای دانشگاهي تعريف كرد به جای سياسی تعريف كردن، سياست قوميتی و رئولیتیک را تعريف كرد.

شايد تفاوت بین رئولیتیک و انتروژئولیتیک در اين موضوع است كه مفهوم دوم به رئولیتیک علاوه بر سطح كشورها و نظامهای سياسي در سطح و نقطه نظر مردمان (ملل، ساكنين شهرها، روستاهای شهرها و شهرستانها، بخشها، مناطق) محله های درون شهرها و روستاهای اقوم، گروه‌های ديگر و مذهبی و به طور كلي گروه‌های فردگي، نيز رسيدگي ميكند. مطالعات رئولیتیک سنی بيشتر تمرکز بر دولت‌ها و رئیسیهای جهاني دارند. اين حال، در انتروژئولیتیک مردم و دولت‌ها تعامل تنوگانگي با هم دارند. اين دوالتيک بين آنهاست كه هسته انتروژئولیتیک را تشکيل ميدهد. بنابراین انتروژئولیتیک ميتواند به اين صورت تعريف شود: که نيز ممكن است مانند سابر رشته‌های علوم اجتماعي، اجماع نظر روي یک تعريف، مبهم بماند و همانند ساري ره از ديگر رشته‌ها باستگي به گفتگو، گفتگوی در این رو توسعه ماي Revenue, بر سر بررسی متعارفی و روش مالکیتی است. درک بهتر از اين عرضه ميتواند در گذش زمان تكامل یابد. بنابراين ما

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با تشوقی مشارکت دانشگاه‌های، سیاست‌گذاران و متفکران در تلاش هستیم تا این امر
منجر به گفتمانی بین آنها و ما شود و در نهایت گام به سوی توسعه هر چه بیشتر
اننرپولیتیک بپنهد. نشتمی ما، برای این هدف ایجاد شده است. ما این نام را نیز برای
انجن خود انتخاب کردیم، زیرا این عربه جدید با غفلت و کاهش تامین مالی در
دانشگاه‌ها، به وزه در هنگام تضعیف شده است. ما امید داریم که انجمن ما به صورت
یک انجمن برای یافته‌های تحقیقی، گفتگو و بحث درباره مطالعات اننرپولیتیک عمل
کند و در توسعه این عربه سهمی داشته باشد. بنابراین ما از همه صاحب‌نظران دعوت به
عمل می‌آوریم تا در این امر ما را باری کند. هدایت مدیره نظر خود را تجمل نخواهد کرد.
هیئت تحریریه نشریه کوشش می‌کند تا به کنتین گونه بعمل در مقالات دست‌برد تا
نقطه‌های نویسندگان آشکار و دست‌نخورده بمانند. هر نویسنده مستند دیدگاه‌های
خود در مقاله است و آن دیدگاه‌ها صرف توسط هیئت تحریریه نشریه، و هیئت رئیسه
و کارشناسان انجمن و دانشکده اننرپولیتیک در یا تایید کنند. از روی دیگر هیئت
تحریریه تلاش می‌کند تا کیفیت علمی مقامات بالا بماند و سیستم داوری منصفانه ای
برقرار سازد. یکی از ویژگی‌های این انجمن ما ترویج سیستم داوری شفاف است. نویسندان
مقاله ملزم به پرداخت مبلغی نیستند و دانشمندی در دسترس عموم به صورت رایگان
قرار دارد.

به جز مقالات تحقیقی و یا دیگر، از دیگر اهداف بخش فارسی ما نشریه می‌تواند
مفاهیم، و یا همبستگی (ماده‌سابزی) مفاهیم موجود مربوط به اننرپولیتیک در زبان‌های
دیگر است. بنابراین هیئت تحریریه نشریه و هیئت رئیسه دانشکده ما از مقامات و حی
مکاتباتی چه در زمینه ترجمه و همبستگی مفاهیم موجود و یا تولید مفاهیم نوین، کوشش
باشد استقبال می‌کند. هیئت تحریریه نشریه و هیئت رئیسه این انجمن می‌آموزد (هنوز)
از ویژگی‌های اننرپولیتیک و زوپولیتیک در فارسی استفاده می‌کند، اما از همبستگی آنها در
فارسی استقبال می‌کند. اگر نه، بحث علمی در میان صاحب‌نظران وجود دارد که آیا
زوپولیتیک همان جغرافیای سیاسی است یا خیر. باینکه نظر اینجانب به نطقه
نظر اول تماشا دارد، هم‌بینی در میان صاحب‌نظران وجود ندارد و ویلایت صاحب‌نظران از
نقطه نظر دوست دوستگانی می‌کند. بنابراین هیئت تحریریه نشریه و هیئت رئیسه اینشکده
ما هنوز از ویژگی‌های اننرپولیتیک و زوپولیتیک استفاده می‌کند، اما از همبستگی معنی‌دار
آنها به وارثان نوین در فارسی استقبال می‌کنند.

جلسه تاسیس غیررسمی موسسه «انجمن مطالعات اثنوژئوپلیتیک» در مرکز کنگره بای در آمستردام در ۱۱ مه ۲۰۱۰ صورت گرفت. انجمن رسمی با اساسنامه بطور رسمی در تاریخ ۱ سپتامبر ۲۰۱۱ ایجاد شد. امید است کارشناسان و متخصصان بیشتری به این انجمن بپیوندند و با حمایت‌های مادی و معنی‌های مشارکتی فعال داشته باشند و همچنین بخشی از کمیته مشورتی آن شوند.

بابک رضوی، سرчерاغ نشیبی، آمستردام، مارس ۲۰۱۹

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Endnote

Special Article

ديالکتیک زئوبولیتیک سنتی و زئوبولیتیک انتقادی
(Dialectics between Classical and Critical Geopolitics)

مجتبی شعیبی (Mojtaba Shoeibi)

Abstract in English: This article discusses about the differences, similarities, and hence also the dialectics, between classical and critical geopolitics.

Key Words: Geographical Space, Dialectics, Geopolitics, Classical Geopolitics, Critical Geopolitics

کلید واژه‌ها: فضای جغرافیایی، دیالکتیک، زئوبولیتیک، زئوبولیتیک سنتی، زئوبولیتیک انتقادی

از زمانی که در اواخر قرن نوزدهم قدرت‌های پرگر جهانی و بخش‌های امیرات‌های بریتانیا به نقش و اهمیت کنترل فضاهای جغرافیایی در بسط و تثبیت قدرت در مقياس جهانی پی بردند زئوبولیتیک اهمیت بسزایی یافت. در همان زمان محققان نظری فردیش راتزل و رودولف کیلیان نخستین تحقیقات ممنسجم در مورد زئوبولیتیک را منتشر کردند و به این ترتیب با ایجاد این گفتگوهای جغرافیایی توجه طرف گسترده‌ای از محققان، سیاستمداران و استراتژیستهای جهانی را به سوی مفهوم زئوبولیتیک جذب کردند. از اواخر قرن نوزدهم تا دهه 80 قرن بیستم میلادی ساخت این زیرشاخه جغرافیا تحت تأثیر و نفوذ محققان و
مجله شعیب متخصص جغرافیاهای سیاسی و دانشجوی دکتراردانشگاه تربیت مدرس تهران است. اون تزییر مستند بخش فارسی این نشریه حاضر است.

Mojtaba Shoeibi, the new senior editor for the Persian section of our journal, is Ph.D. Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the Department of Political Geography, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran  mshoeibi@modares.ac.ir.
(Bibliography)


NB: do you have any comments on Rezvani’s and Shoeibi’s articles? Please send these (maximum 3,000 words) to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org. These may appear as Critical Responses in the next issue(s) of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged articles. Please supply your name, contact details, titles and affiliations, including your specialisms and any major publications.
Photobook *Srebrenica Commemoration*
by Fred Rohde (photography) & Caspar ten Dam (texts)

The photobook *Srebrenica Commemoration & Marš Mira 2015–2018* is available in print for just € 20 (incl. average € 5 postal charges). Sometime next year it will become available in pdf at [www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications](http://www.ethnogeopolitics.org/publications).


You can order a full print-copy of the photobook by transferring € 20 (VAT-free) to EGP’s Bank account: NL83 INGB 0752 45 8760 BIC: INGBNL2A T. a. o. Servet Sahin, Amsterdam, with a reference to “photobook Srebrenica”—please email your postal address to info@ethnogeopolitics.org so we can send a print-copy to you.
Main Article—Developments in the field

Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Developments

Babak Rezvani

A much shorter ‘teaser’ version of this essay on the evolution of Ethnogeopolitics as a multi-faceted and multidisciplinary field of studies, has appeared in an earlier issue of this journal (see Rezvani 2018: 8).

Abstract

Ethnogeopolitics is a new concept, indicating an emerging multidisciplinary field of research. Theoretical development of, and discussion about, ethnogeopolitics as an academic (sub-)discipline, are among the main scopes of Association for the Study of Ethnogeopolitics and its journal Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics. Ethnogeopolitics is a type of geopolitics in which in addition to traditional political, strategic and economic factors, attention is paid to cultural factors in particular. Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics does not necessarily endorse the ideas of all authors who have used the term ethnogeopolitics. However, it is fair to state that regarding
the subjects of study and the levels of analysis, ethnogeopolitics is fairly close to “Subversive Geopolitics” and particularly close to the French school of “géopolitique interne et externe”. Nevertheless, a typification of ethnogeopolitics remains the subject of its further development as a (sub-)discipline.

Keywords
Geopolitics, Subversive Geopolitics, Géopolitique Interne et Externe, Levels of Analysis, Critical Geopolitics, Ethnogeopolitics, Political Geography, Cultural Geography, International Relations

Introduction
Theoretical development of, and discussion about, Ethnogeopolitics as an academic (sub-)discipline, are among the main scopes of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics and its journal titled Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics. After more than seven years of producing issues of this journal, it is appropriate to reflect upon the developments of Ethnogeopolitics. The section “developments”, of which this article is the first one, serves this purpose.

We hope that we will discuss the development of Ethnogeopolitics within this section regularly, and preferably annually. This section should not necessarily be authored by our journals' editors. In fact, we welcome contributions of scholars on the said theme, and invite everyone, from all relevant academic (sub-)disciplines, to contribute to it. As I put in the maiden Editorial of our journal, “Ethnogeopolitics, like
any other academic field, is dynamic and subject to change and conceptual and methodological development. A better understanding of this field can only evolve as time passes. Therefore, we encourage contributions from academics, policymakers and thinkers—in order to engender dialogue with each other and with us—which should contribute to the further development of ethnogeopolitics” (Rezvani 2013: 5).

As I put in subsequent publications, "Ethnogeopolitics is a new concept, indicating an emerging multidisciplinary field of research. Its definition and scope of study depends much on those of related (sub-)disciplines, particularly those of geopolitics” (Rezvani 2013: 4; see also Rezvani & Ilyasov 2017: 7).

The previous quote is from the first article of Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics published nearly seven years ago. Is it fair to state that ethnogeopolitics is now an established concept? I tend to answer this question in the affirmative. Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics already exists longer than seven years and is growing. Also, public interest and contributions to our journal continue to grow.

Indeed, Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics has started to publish also in other languages than English, such as Russian, Spanish and German, and also in Persian and possibly other languages in the near future. Especially Spanish is a useful language, as Indigenous peoples, a lot of whom are living in Latin America, constitute a main focus of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics’ studies.
Nowadays the term “Geopolitics” is being widely—and perhaps it is fair to say loosely—used in the media, perhaps as a more elegant equivalent for international relations, inter-state strategic, security and even economic relations, and foreign policy. This situation has not always been so. Particularly in Europe the term Geopolitics was cautiously avoided owing to its alleged association with German National Socialism. This current article does not intend to discuss this issue at length. However, two remarks could be made that disprove such an allegation: Geopolitics—and Political Geography in general—is an academic field and not an ideology; and it is remarkable that the German National Socialist claim that their empire will last 1000 years, contradicts the organic German classical geopolitical ideas that a state is an organism which grows but also ultimately dies.

First in 1995, as a student of international relations, I wanted to write a paper using the geopolitical approach. I was discouraged by others to do so, and I did not proceed. It was remarkable that in our intellectually excellent Dutch reading book Wereldorde en Machtspolitiek: Visies op de Internationale Betrekkingen van Dante tot Fukuyama (World order and Power politics: Visions on International Relations from Dante tot Fukuyama) (Van Der Pijl 1992), Geopolitics was discussed using the German term Geopolitik.

However, in 1998 I managed to attend an intriguing course about Geopolitics, using the book National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (Dijkink 1996), offered by human geographers at the University of Amsterdam, among whom the term geopolitics was regarded and used as a broad, legitimate, and neutral term.
Gert-Jan Dijkink is a prominent political geographer whose work can be typified as Critical Geopolitics. I had not yet encountered the term “Ethnogeopolitics”. However, concentrating on the Caucasus, I argued that the cultural demographic policies of the Iranian Safavid Empire and the Soviet Nationalities Policy could be called ethnogeopolitics.

Nevertheless, as the term “Ethnogeopolitics” was not yet an established term, I was advised to use instead the terms ethnic geopolitics or simply political and cultural geography in my writings, which I did. However, later, despite serious objections, and wrong associations, I decided in the end to use the term after all. One reason was, exactly, that I did not want a semantically meaningful, and otherwise academically neutral, term be exclusively used and associated with a particular stream or school of thought (see below).

Situating EthnoGeoPolitics

What is Ethnogeopolitics? A definition of Ethnogeopolitics is highly dependent on a definition of Geopolitics. There are no general agreements about its definition, as different types of Geopolitics could be distinguished. Ó Tuathail (2006: 8) distinguishes three types of geopolitics: 1-Formal—i.e. of scholars’, 2-Practical—i.e. of policymakers’, and 3-popular—i.e. prevalent among public opinion.

These types of geopolitics are ideal-types and may overlap in practice; e.g. a scholar may be a member of a policymaking think-tank or a politician at the same time. Mamadouh (1998: 238-239; 2009) maintains a quadratic typology. In fact, she disregards—perhaps for
the purposes of clarity—the popular type and adds explicitly one more dimension: State-centeredness—i.e. whether the type only regards the territorial nation-state as the only geopolitical actor or recognizes more, other kinds of actors (see table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Four geopolitical approaches (Mamadouh 1998: 239)</th>
<th>Policy oriented</th>
<th>Purely Academic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>States</strong></td>
<td>neo-classical geopolitics, geopolitics, géostratégie, geoeconomics</td>
<td>non-geopolitics, political geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other political actors</strong></td>
<td>subversive geopolitics, géopolitique interne et externe</td>
<td>post-structuralistic geopolitics, critical geopolitics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the fact that Ethnogeopolitics focuses on cultural—in addition to political, strategic and economic—factors, it could be placed in table 1’s bottom row, either in the cell together with “Géopolitique Interne et Externe” or in the other cell together with “Critical Geopolitics”.

However, Ethnogeopolitics is not necessarily post-structuralist. In fact, Ethnogeopolitics’ primary focus is the subject of study rather than its methodology. The applied methods are largely determined by the research questions. Hence, ethnogeopolitics’ “place” in the table may be in either cell, depending on its policy vs. academic orientation.

In addition to the (nation-)state, a typical ethnogeopolitical analysis
recognizes more actors that could be, and function, at the state, sub-state or supra-state level. An ethnogeopolitical study may not always be premediated by a policy problem. However, regarding their focus and levels of analysis, ethnogeopolitical studies are often politically relevant.

It is fair to say that Ethnogeopolitics is closer to the French school of Géopolitique Interne et Externe of Yves Lacoste's (see e.g. Lacoste 1993; 1995) and his associates at the journal Hérodote, than it is to Critical Geopolitics (Mamadouh 1998: 139-141; see also Flint 2006: 3-17). However, this issue remains a subject of further development of and discussion within Ethnogeopolitics as a (sub-)discipline.

Mark Bassin's 2009 paper titled “The Emergence of Ethno-Geopolitics in Post-Soviet Russia” is perhaps the first English-language paper on this topic published in an authoritative academic journal. Bassin cites a number of Soviet and Russian sources and authors, and discusses the geopolitical ideas and discourse of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy—who maintains a civilizational geopolitical approach (c.f. Huntington 1993; 1996).

According to Bassin (2009: 137-145) Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's ideas are often contradicting and he often (ab)uses ideas of Lev Gumilev. Gumilev became famous after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Arguably his ideas serve the Russian geopolitical code of Eurasianism after the collapse of the bipolar world.²

Bassin (2009: 142-143) cites Russian sources that regard the Soviet Union as an ethnosystem (etnosistema). It is questionable whether the
Russians were the first ones who used the term ethnogeopolitics. However, regarding the Soviet Nationalities Policy and Soviet preoccupation with ethno-national, and broadly cultural, engineering it is logical that the concept—or even the term—is used by Russians.

For sure, Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics is not affiliated with, and does not endorse or represent, the ideas of Zhirinovsky and other authors cited in Mark Bassin’s 2009 paper. Perhaps it is superfluous, but interesting, to mention that ethnogeopolitics is written as ethno-geopolitics—with a hyphen—in the Russian sources mentioned by Bassin (2009), but as EthnoGeoPolitics (or simply Ethnogeopolitics) by Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics.

Thus “Geopolitics can be focused on military strategy, economics and natural resources, but also on culture. The latter focus on culture is what could be called ethnogeopolitics” (Rezvani 2013: 4). Therefore,

[E]thnogeopolitics in a narrow sense is an intersection of ethnicity and geopolitics; that is, when ethnicity and ethnic identity, and in general cultural attributes of peoples, matter—and affect the foreign policy and security of one or more countries. Ethnogeopolitics is thus a good tool for understanding and explaining ethnic conflict, civil war and transnational political issues... [However] in a broad sense [ethnogeopolitics]...encompasses all its sub-elements, and what each sub-element contains. It encompasses ethnogeography, ethnopolitics and geopolitics, as well as ethnic studies, geography and political science in general. All these disciplines and subdisciplines are broad, and their definitions and scopes vary in different schools and among different scholars (Rezvani 2013: 4).
In studies published until now in *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, and by scholars associated with Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics in other journal and (book) publications as well, special attention is paid to people living in a state or region, and their cultural attributes, such as language, religion, belief systems etc. are regarded as geopolitically relevant factors.

By ‘people(s)’ we do not exclusively refer to national groups; for us the term includes or can include also other types of social groups—whether natives or migrants—such as sub-national and transnational ethnic, religious, ethno-religious groups, indigenous peoples in colonized areas especially in the Oceania and the Americans, and castes in societies in which they are (still) socially relevant, like the Dalits in India (see Garimella 2014; Kumar 2015; Prasad 2015).

Internationally renowned scholars like George Bournoutian (2015), Willem Floor (2015) and Ronald Grigor Suny (2015) have contributed to our journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*. Among the conceptual developments is worth to mention Arnav Anjaria’s 2017 paper titled ‘The Tibetan Culture Area: Contours and Civilizational Linkages”, which has introduced the concept of Tibetan Culture Area, based on a diffusion of Tibetan Buddhism within civilizational geopolitics. Indeed, “Culture Area” could be a good substitute for “Civilization” (c.f. Huntington 1996) as the latter is multifaceted, includes several other diverging factors than only religion, and, hence, is more difficult to apply in geopolitical analyses. Caspar Ten Dam (e.g. Ten Dam 2015) has discussed a new Brutalization Theory which could be a useful theory in studying ethnic and religious conflicts. Bo Petersson (Petersson 2015) has explained the importance of Area Studies.
Naturally, the utility of generalist, often quantitative, studies for ethnogeopolitical studies cannot be denied. Even so, the intimate knowledge of an area or region—be it either (within) a country or of transnational nature—often offers a better understanding of the situation and the actual relations of powers in a region, a country or an area within a country.

Concluding Remarks

Association for the study of EthnoGeoPolitics and its journal Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics intend to offer a venue for relevant research papers, analytic discussions and debate, and hence contribute to the development of Ethnogeopolitics as an academic (sub-)field.

Ethnogeopolitics is a type of Geopolitics in which in addition to traditional political, strategic and economic factors, attention is paid also—or above all—to cultural factors.

Association for the study of EthnoGeoPolitics is not affiliated with and does not necessarily endorse the ideas of certain streams of thought, such as those of Zhirinovsky and his associates. However, Russia—and the Post-Soviet Space in general—is undeniably an important area of the world where ethnogeopolitical thoughts and policies have been prevalent.

Ethnogeopolitics and ethnogeopolitical analyses are fairly close to “subversive Geopolitics” and particularly close to the French school of “Géopolitique Interne et Externe”. Nevertheless, a typification of Ethno-
geopolitics remains the subject of its further development as a (sub-)discipline.

As mentioned before, this new ‘Development’ section should not necessarily be authored by the editors of *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* alone. This journal welcomes contributions of scholars on this theme of discipline-development and invites everyone to contribute to it.

*Dr. Babak Rezvani, Chairman of Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics and Editor-in-Chief of its journal, is a Research Associate at the Universities of Amsterdam and Nijmegen, the Netherlands. bkrezvani@gmail.com.*

**Endnotes**

1. See also www.youtube.com/watch?v=MK6shV4M24Q&t=1172s.
2. See e.g. www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHvVhqWuykE.

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Integrating Culture in Social and Political Sciences

(First Critical Response to Babak Rezvani’s “Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Developments”)

“Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Development” by Dr. Babak Rezvani, is an attempt by the author to prove the viability of the term ‘ethnogeopolitics’. His attempt in his formative years to use the geopolitical approach, and having been discouraged, has not hindered him the least bit.

For more than twenty years he has studied, done extensive research in Central Asia and written authoritatively on topics which show the relevance of the culture of ethnic groups to border conflicts, i.e. ethnic groups who live on frontiers of their nation-states, who for myriad reasons get into conflicts. And he has shown once and again how culture is used to ablaze the fire of these conflicts.

Originally, geography, presence of mountains and rivers, decided for the border of ethnic groups. Later, politicians made these the frontiers of nation-states. Ethnic groups on both sides of mountains or rivers who would cross these barriers—nowadays forbidden or discouraged due to laws and regulations of nation-states which set barbed wires, and made crossing borders impossible matters, unless authorization came from a center—are facing lots of difficulties.

As the depth of this problem is becoming clearer, scholars try to reify concepts, which could be used in classrooms to make the students who
are far from an understanding of such conflicts to logically comprehend them. But every field of study has its own literature and places this problem within its own vocabulary and concepts.

What Dr. Rezvani is trying to do is, given his personal research and involvement on the ground, to bring various fields of political geography, political science, political geography, international relations and anthropology together so as to better understand that culture, a concept central to anthropology, is necessary to be included in any research related to borders, frontiers, conflicts.

Culture is a “material” used to create conflict, just as it can be used to bring about peace. All ethnic groups are defined by their cultures consisting of their language, history, geography, customs, rituals, habitat, food, clothing … which together constitutes the definition of their particular culture areas. These give plenty of possibilities for defining the identity of a group and thus open the possibility for differences to be seen and eventually conflicts to arise, and also their resolutions to be thought of.

Attention paid to culture can prepare students to realize that conflict is man-made and just as it is produced it can be overcome. As time passes and we encounter more and more devastating situations ever since the Second World War on Third World national frontiers, we should congratulate the author of the above article for his persistence and his speaking about development of this concept of ethnogeopolitics.

The author’s endeavor has helped to bring about a Forum, a journal
and an association of ethnogeopolitics, to make students realize that human life is fragile and that culture, which defines human beings as a species, should be comprehended and be used as an instrument of bringing about peace—and not conflict and devastation as we are observing today all over the world.

- Soheila Shahshahani, Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran  soheilairan@gmail.com

“Understanding EthnoGeoPolitics and its Developments”: A Brief Review

(Second Critical Response to Babak Rezvani's “Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Developments”)

Post-modern geopolitics unlike its classical “predecessor” is a very contextual branch of science, which covers a bunch of issues: political, cultural, historic, economic and geographical. All those issues very much affect geopolitical decision-making.

The ethnic component of geopolitics should be taken into account in a very serious way. Geopolitics and Nationalism are twin brothers. Almost all geopolitical (including geo-economical) developments are related to ethnic/religious problems.

The given article provides a good understanding of EthnoGeoPolitics, in particular its role and place in the system of geographical and
political studies. It should be mentioned that EthnoGeoPolitics recognizes plenty of actors of international relations starting from governments down to small ethnic, religious and social groups of population. The levels of analysis are another positive side of EthnoGeoPolitics. It reviews all international developments through the lens of global-local.

EthnoGeoPolitical studies promise to be very important in the post-Soviet space. The Soviet Union was a unique construct, build on the one hand as a free union of peoples, where in fact all republics used to practice ethno-nationalistic principles. Did the situation improve after the collapse of the Soviet empire? The EthnoGeoPolitical approach hopefully will dedicate special attention to the issue.

It should be noted that the foundation of the 'Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics' journal will contribute to the further development of debate on extremely actual issues of geopolitics. I myself welcome the general ideas provided in the given article.

- Giorgi Gogsadze, Professor, Head of the Department of Human Geography at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia
Excerpt from ‘Ethnogeopolitics: Scholarly Fashion or Emerging Discipline?’ (forthcoming)

(Third Critical Response to Babak Rezvani’s “Understanding Ethnogeopolitics and its Developments”)

This excerpt—here serving as a critical response to Rezvani’s maiden contribution in the journal’s new ‘Developments in the field’ section as shown in the current issue—is taken from a forthcoming contribution by Jeffrey Kaplan in the journal’s same new section.

From the killing fields of Kampuchea in the 1970s, the camps and battlegrounds of the wars in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s or the murderous violence from such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Africa of today, the need for a viable cultural component to the field of Geopolitics could not be more clear or more pressing. But none of these conflicts represents the sort of existential threat to the West that 9/11 and all that followed constituted, and so there exists no similar pressure to produce seemingly from whole cloth a field that could help policymakers and journalists alike to make sense of the seemingly unexplainable.

The field of Ethnogeopolitics will remain for some time to come a somewhat fashionable subset of larger disciplines. But that it has perhaps a brighter future is indicated by several very positive trends.

The Association for the Study of EthnoGeoPolitics, founded in 2010-2011 in the Netherlands, was a very promising start. Its original brief
however, was focused on Eurasia. This had the benefit of identifying research institutes and universities with which to establish cooperative relations, but at the same time limited its scope geographically. At this stage, Ethnogeopolitics as a field was not yet ready to go fully beyond its origins in Russia and the Former Soviet Union.

The launch of the Association's journal, *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* in 2013 marked a turning point however. Its premier issue in Spring 2013 boasted articles not only related to the FSU, but on Turkey and Nepal as well. Subsequent issues expanded not just the geographic scope of the field, but also increased its depth and interdisciplinary focus.

However, while the journal is peer-reviewed and charges no publication fees, it is open-access, which older and more hidebound scholars will find questionable. It is a model that remains controversial in academe, which some tenure committees find acceptable and others (including every committee on which I have served) simply do not.

In sum, the future of the field is still very much in flux. The journal *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* and the quality of the academics surrounding it speaks of a very bright future. Indeed, each subsequent issue of the journal shows a remarkable growth of Editorial staff, moving far beyond the first issue's triumvirate of Babak Rezvani, Caspar ten Dam and Servet Sahin. All three are to be congratulated on their pioneering work and on the vision that both their association and journal evince.

I believe that with this start, Ethnogeopolitics as an emerging field and
discipline will have vital place in the social sciences and humanities in particular; I hope that I can in a small way be a part of that development.

- Jeffrey Kaplan, Professor at Habib University in Karachi, Pakistan

NB: do you have any comments on Babak Rezvani’s article and/or the Critical Responses? Please send these (maximum 3,000 words) to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org. These may appear as Critical Responses in the next issue(s) of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged articles. Please supply your name, contact details, titles and affiliations, including your specialisms and any major publications.
Discrimination and Segregation due to a “Southern” or Non-European Appearance

Rodolfo Valentino, with collaboration from Stuart Kisitu

The two subsequent contributions in this journal concern German and Spanish texts of the same article translated by the author himself. Dr. Rodolfo Valentino forms part of both the German and Spanish sections in our Editorial Board.

I. Classism and Social Protectionism

Classism and social protectionism have been sufficiently studied as social phenomena by sociologists. To the question of how the members of a supposed “class”, “social environment” or “common lifestyle” “sniff” each other or identify themselves, would answer the German sociologist Norbert Elias and his French colleague Pierre Bourdieu: very simple, by the “Social Habitus”.

Elias defines it as common habits in the thinking, feelings and actions of members of the same figuration (a network of dependence due to the conviction of a supposed belonging and social solidarity), which leads directly to a similar or identical “social personality”.

Bourdieu enters more into “plastic details” and defines the “habitus” as the person as a whole: his appearance, his lifestyle, his language (code), clothes and taste, so the habitus becomes an immutable defect that
consciously or unconsciously activates the “racist” or “classist” strategies of a “social protectionism” to defend the interests of the supposed “class”. We are facing a social dilemma that is reinforced by the fact that individual errors or deviant behaviors quickly become a social stigma, which cannot be removed.

II. Discrimination and Segregation because of a “Southern” or Non-European Appearance

Especially in the countries of Northern Europe, there is another factor that influences. Here we find a much more obvious social fact whose “covering-up” can only be explained by the taboos that these societies have regarding aspects of “race” and “ethnicity” that seem to be politically incorrect.

However, for the majority of the interview partners in our study in three European countries, it is a social fact and they know very well what a “Southern” appearance means by describing it with their own words such as dark hair, dark eyes and dark skin. So there is no doubt that it influences as an “amplifier of discrimination” in everyday life. And that there is a hierarchy of discrimination.

In Spain, it is obviously not enough to have a “Southern” or “South-European” appearance to be discriminated. Here, the appearance must be more non-European, e.g. of African or Latin American ethnic groups. In Germany and England, the “Southern” or “South-European” appearance is enough to be discriminated.
Therefore, the appearance or cultural background becomes a visible social fact and a “tool of discrimination” for people with racist, xenophobic or excluding inclinations.

In Germany, among the interview partners the definition of a “Southern” or “South-European” appearance varies considerably depending on the region and the self-image of the person. Even so the person with dark hair, dark eyes, dark skin can be directly victim of xenophobic violence in the New Ländere such as Saxony-Anhalt, while in North Rhine-Westphalia more visible or invisible additional features are needed to identify the other as “different” and to discriminate him/her.

Both in Germany and in England, people with an Arabic or Turkish background, with obvious Muslim clothes or lifestyle, as well as people with an African or Asian background (in Germany less) experience more discrimination than other groups. “Latinos” claim to be less victims of racism and xenophobia as long as they are identified as such.

However, the one who has dark skin, wears a headscarf, has non-German or English facial features or speaks with an accent are more discriminated than Germans or Englishmen of Spanish, Italian or Portuguese origin, although they have a South European appearance. They are identified as Europeans because of their “social habit”. A special case form the 78% (95% in the New Ländere) of German women who “think twice or three times” of the social consequences before having a relationship with a “Southerner” or a South European.

These are the conclusions of a non-representative but socially relevant
online study conducted by the Independent European Sociological Research EUROSOR in Santander (Spain) until January 15, 2018, with a total of 1828 interviewed people with and without immigration background in Spain, Germany and England. About half (930) were interviewed as victims of discrimination and xenophobia.

The authors of the study (Stuart Kisitu / Dr. Rodolfo Valentino) recognize that discrimination experiences are subjective and are a very “unstable” indicator of the level of xenophobia and racism. On the other hand, the open social conflicts between those affected and the defenders of a “typical English, German or Spanish aspect” are clearly manifested, socially relevant and should be studied more thoroughly.

The results can be summarized in three conclusions:

(1) 23% (D) [Germany], 27% (E) [Spain] and 35% (EN) [England] of people with a migrant background, who claim to be “typically English, German or Spanish”, feel disadvantaged in their respective countries.
(2) 38% (E), 43% (EN) and 53% (D) of people with visible migrant background speak of selective discrimination in words and actions.
(3) The Turks in Germany (67%), the Africans (67%) and the Pakistanis (78%) in England, and the Africans (71%), the North Africans (54%) and the Latin Americans (44%) in Spain, are the most disadvantaged and discriminated groups.
(4) In all countries, Muslims are discriminated more frequently, with 67% in Germany, 53% in England and 38% in Spain. In the case of people with Christian or non-confessional values, the value is considerably lower than 35% with 33% (D), 29% (EN) and 16% (E).
III. Outlook

Experts agree that in countries that have experienced strong immigration in recent decades, especially in Germany, England, but also in Spain, it is precisely racism and discrimination that can poison social coexistence and create an atmosphere of suspicion, distrust, latent hatred, prejudice and racial violence.

The online study shows that the identification by appearance and cultural background work well as a strategy of discrimination and segregation and is firmly anchored in the minds of Europeans, especially of the North Europeans. The European Union and social partners, such as schools, universities, companies, etc., but also the society as a whole, should be aware of the problem and promote social and European cohesion more decisively.

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Diskriminierung und Segregation aufgrund des südländischen oder nichteuropäischen Aussehens

Rodolfo Valentino, unter Mitarbeit von Stuart Kisitu

The preceding contribution in this issue of our journal concerns the English text of the same article translated by the author himself into German. Dr. Rodolfo Valentino forms part of both the German and Spanish sections in our Editorial Board.

I. Klassismus und Sozialprotektionismus


Elias definiert den “sozialen Habitus” als gemeinsame Gewohnheiten im Denken, Fühlen und Handeln, die Mitgliedern einer Figuration (ein Abhängigkeitsgeflecht aufgrund von gedachter und vermuteter Zugehörigkeit und Solidarität) eigen sind und dadurch eine ähnliche “soziale Persönlichkeitsstruktur” aufweisen.

Bourdieu geht stärker ins “plastische” Detail und definiert den Habitus
als Gesamtpaket einer Person: ihr gesamtes Auftreten, ihr Lebensstil, ihre Sprache (Sprachcode), ihre Kleidung und ihren Geschmack. Die Klasse und somit auch der Habitus wird nicht selten als unveränderbares „Sozialmakel” angesehen und aktiviert bewusst oder unbewusst „sozialrassistische” oder klassistische Strategien des „Sozial-Protektionismus” zum Erhalt der vermeintlich eigenen „Klasse”. Ein soziales Dilemma, das noch mal dadurch verstärkt wird, dass Fehltritte oder abweichendes Verhalten rasch zum Sozialstigma werden, das man praktisch nicht mehr abstreifen kann.

II. Diskriminierung und Segregation aufgrund des südländischen oder nichteuropäische Aussehens

In nordeuropäischen Ländern kommt eine viel offensichtlichere soziale Tatsache dazu, deren „Vertuschung” nur darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass man anderes Aussehen schnell mit „Rasse” identifiziert und politisch inkorrekt in der Tabukiste verschwindet.

Trotzdem ist südeuropäisches oder „südländisches” Aussehen (dunkle Haare, dunkle Augen, dunkle Hautfarbe) für die meisten Befragten unserer Studie in drei europäischen Ländern eine soziale Tatsache, die man sehr gut mit eigenen Worten beschreiben und zum „Diskriminierungsverstärker” im Alltag werden kann. Interessant ist, dass es eine Diskriminierungshierarchie gibt.

In Spanien reicht kein südeuropäisches Aussehen, um diskriminiert zu werden. Hier muss das Aussehen schon außereuropäisch sein, z.B. an afrikanische und lateinamerikanische Ethnien erinnern.
In Deutschland und England reicht hingegen schon südeuropäisches Aussehen wie dunkle Haare, dunkle Augen, dunklere Hautfarbe, etc. So wird das Aussehen zu einem sichtbaren Migrationshintergrund und damit zu einer “Diskriminierungshilfe” für Personen mit rassistischen, ausländerfeindlichen oder exkludierenden Neigungen.

In Deutschland sprechen die Befragten von “nichtdeutschem” Aussehen, das aber von Interviewpartner zu Interviewpartner stark in Bezug auf Selbstbild, Region und Beschreibungsmerkmale variierte. Ein südeuropäisches Aussehen wie dunkle Haare, dunkle Augen, dunklere Hautfarbe kann in Sachsen-Anhalt direkt dazu führen, dass man Opfer von rechtsradikaler Gewalt wird, während in NRW für eine Diskriminierung noch zusätzliche sichtbare oder unsichtbare Merkmale hinzukommen müssen, um den Anderen als “anders” einzustufen.


Wer also eine dunkle Hautfarbe hat, ein Kopftuch trägt, als “nichtdeutsch” geltende Gesichtszüge hat oder mit deutlichem Akzept spricht, erlebt in Deutschland und England häufiger Diskriminierung als ein Deutscher/Engländer mit spanischem, italienischem oder
portugiesischem Migrationshintergrund, der zwar südeuropäisch aussieht, aber durch seinen “sozialen Habitus” nicht so auffällt. Ein Sonderfall bilden 78% (in den neuen Bundesländern 95%) der weiblichen Befragten in Deutschland, die sich “zwei- oder dreimal” wegen der sozialen Folgen überlegen, ob sie sich auf einen “Südländer” bzw. Südeuropäer einlassen.


Den Autoren der Studie (Stuart Kisitu, Dr. Rodolfo Valentino) ist klar, dass die subjektiven Diskriminierungserfahrungen ein sehr “wackeliger” Indikator für das Niveau von Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Rassismus darstellt. Anderseits manifestieren sich hier offene gesellschaftliche Konflikte zwischen Betroffenen und Verteidigern von “typisch englischen, deutschem oder spanischem Aussehen”, die sozial relevant sind und in folgenden Studien näher betrachtet werden müssen.

Die Ergebnisse lassen sich in drei Schlussfolgerungen zusammenfassen:

(1) 23 % (D) [Deutschland], 27% (E) [Spanien] und 35% (EN) [England] der Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, die nach
eigenen Angaben “typisch englisch, deutsch oder spanisch” aussehen, fühlen sich in den jeweiligen Ländern benachteiligt.

(2) 38% (E), 43% (EN) und 53% (D) der Menschen mit sichtbarem Migrationshintergrund sprechen von gezielter Diskriminierung in Wort und Handeln.

(3) Am häufigsten fühlten sich Türken in Deutschland (67%), Afrikaner (67%) und Pakistanis (78%) in England sowie Afrikaner (71%), Nordafrikaner (54%) und Lateinamerikaner (44%) in Spanien benachteiligt.

(4) In allen Ländern werden Muslime mit 67% in Deutschland, 53% in England und 38% in Spanien häufiger diskriminiert. Bei Menschen mit christlicher oder ohne Konfession liegt der Wert durchgehend bei unter 35%, u.z. 33% (D), 29% (EN) und 16% (E).

III. Ausblick

Experten sind sich darüber einig, dass gerade in Ländern, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten starke Einwanderung erlebt haben, allen voran Deutschland, England, aber auch Spanien, Rassismus und Diskriminierung das gesellschaftliche, aber auch das europäische Miteinander vergiften und eine Atmosphäre des Argwohns, des Misstrauens, des latenten Hasses, der Vorurteile und der rassistischen Gewalt hervorrufen können.

Die Online-Studie zeigt, dass Aussehen und Herkunft als Diskriminierungs- und Segregationsstrategien bestens funktionieren und sehr tief in den Köpfen der Menschen verankert sind. Gerade die
europäische Union sowie alle Sozialagenten wie Schulen, Universitäten, Betriebe, etc. aber auch die Gesellschaft als Ganzes müssen für das Problem sensibilisiert werden und entschiedener als bisher den gesellschaftlichen und europäischen Zusammenhalt fördern.

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NB: do you have any comments on Valentino’s article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.
Discriminación y Segregación en Alemania, España e Inglaterra a causa de una Apariencia Sureña o No Europea

Rodolfo Valentino, con la colaboración de Stuart Kisitu

The preceding two contributions in this issue of our journal concern the English and German texts of the same article translated by the author himself into Spanish. Dr. Rodolfo Valentino forms part of both the German and Spanish sections in our Editorial Board.

I. Klasismo y Proteccionismo

El clasismo y el proteccionismo social han sido suficientemente estudiados como fenómenos sociales por sociólogos. A la pregunta de cómo los miembros de una supuesta misma “clase”, “un ambiente social” o “estilo de vida” común “se huelen” entre sí o se identifican, responderían el sociólogo alemán Norbert Elias y su colega francés Pierre Bourdieu: muy simple, a través del “Habitus Social”.

Elias lo define como hábitos comunes en el pensamiento, los sentimientos y las acciones de miembros de una misma figuración (una red de dependencia debido a la convicción de una supuesta pertenencia y solidaridad social), que conduce directamente a una “personalidad social” parecida o idéntica.

Bourdieu entra más en “detalles plásticos” y define el “habitus” como la
persona en su totalidad: su apariencia, su estilo de vida, su lenguaje (código), ropa y gusto. Así que el habitus se convierte en un defecto inmutable que activa conscientemente o inconscientemente las estrategias “racistas” o “clasistas” de un “proteccionismo social” para defender los intereses de la supuesta propia “clase”. Estamos ante un dilema social que se ve reforzado por el hecho de que los errores o comportamientos desviados se convierten rápidamente en un estigma social, que prácticamente ya no se puede quitar.

II. Discriminación y Segregación a causa de una Apariencia Sureña o No Europea

Especially en los países del norte de Europa, hay otro factor que influye. Aquí nos encontramos con un hecho social mucho más obvio cuyo “encubrimiento” solo se puede explicar con los tabues que tienen estas sociedades en cuanto a aspectos de “raza” y “etnia” que parecen ser políticamente incorrectos.

Si embargo para la mayoría de los encuestados de nuestro estudio en tres países europeos es un hecho social y saben muy bien, lo que significa una apariencia “sureña” describiéndola con sus propias palabras como pelo oscuro, ojos oscuros y piel oscura. Así que no cabe duda de que influya como “amplificador de discriminación” en la vida cotidiana. Curiosamente, hay una jerarquía de discriminación.

En España, obviamente no es bastante tener una apariencia “sureña” o “sudeuropea” para ser discriminado. Aquí, la apariencia ya tiene que ser no europea, p. ej. de grupos étnicos africanos o latinoamericanos.
En Alemania y de Inglaterra la aperiencia “sureña” o “sudeuropea” ya es suficiente para ser discriminado. Por lo tanto, el aspecto o la apariencia se vuelve un hecho visible social y una "herramienta de discriminación" para las personas con inclinaciones racistas, xenófobas o excluyentes.

En Alemania, entre los encuestados varía considerablemente la definición de una apariencia “sureña” o “sudeuropeo” dependiendo de la región y la autoimagen de la persona. Aún así la persona con pelo oscuro, ojos oscuros, piel oscura puede ser directamente víctima de violencia xenófoba en los Nuevos Länder como Sajonia-Anhalt, mientras que en Renania del Norte-Westfalia se necesitan más características visibles o invisibles adicionales para identificar al otro como “diferente” y discriminarlo.

Tanto en Alemania como en Inglaterra la gente con trasfondo árabe o turco, con ropa o estilo de vida musulmana evidentes, así como las personas con trasfondo africano o asiático (en Alemania menos) viven más discriminaciones que otros grupos. Los “latinos” afirman ser menos víctimas de racismo y xenofobia siempre que sean identificados como tales.

Es decir, el que tiene la piel oscura, lleva un pañuelo en la cabeza, tiene rasgos faciales no alemanes o ingleses o habla con acento son más discriminados que los alemanes o ingleses de origen español, italiano o portugués, que aunque tengan apariencia sudeuropea, son identificados como europeos por su “hábito social”. Un caso especial forman el 78% (95% en los Nuevos Länder) de la mujeres alemanas.
que “se lo piensan dos o tres veces” por las consecuencias sociales que conlleva, relacionarse con un “sureño” o un sudeuropeo.

Estas son las conclusiones de un estudio en línea no representativo pero socialmente relevante realizado por el “Independent European Sociological Research EUROSOR” en Santander (España) hasta el 15 de enero de 2018, con un total de 1828 personas entrevistadas, con y sin trasfondo migratorio en España, Alemania e Inglaterra. Alrededor de la mitad (930) fueron entrevistados como víctimas de discriminación y xenofobia.

Los autores del estudio, Stuart Kisitu y Dr Rodolfo Valentino, reconocen que las experiencias de discriminación son subjetivas y son un indicador muy “inestable” del nivel de xenofobia y racismo. Por otro lado, se manifiestan claramente los conflictos sociales abiertos entre los afectados y los defensores de un “aspecto típico inglés, alemán o español”, que son socialmente relevantes y que se deberían estudiar más a fondo.

Los resultados se pueden resumir en tres conclusiones:

(1) El 23% (D) [Alemania], el 27% (E) [España] y el 35% (EN) [Inglaterra] de las personas con trasfondo migratorio, que dicen ser “típicamente inglesas, alemanas o españolas”, se sienten desfavorecidas en sus respectivos países.
(2) El 38% (E), 43% (EN) y 53% (D) de las personas con trasfondo migratorio visible hablan de discriminación selectiva en palabras y acciones.
(3) Los turcos en Alemania (67%), los africanos (67%) y los pakistáníes
(78%) en Inglaterra, y los africanos (71%), los norteafricanos (54%) y los latinoamericanos (44%) en España, son los grupos más desfavorecidos y discriminados.

(4) En todos los países, los musulmanes son discriminados con mayor frecuencia, con un 67% en Alemania, un 53% en Inglaterra y un 38% en España. En el caso de personas con valores cristianos o no confesionales, el valor es considerablemente inferior al 35% con 33% (D), 29% (EN) y 16% (E).

III. Perspectiva

Los expertos coinciden en que, en los países que han experimentado una fuerte inmigración en las últimas décadas, sobre todo en Alemania, Inglaterra, pero también en España, son precisamente el racismo y la discriminación los que pueden envenenar la convivencia social pero también la europea, creando una atmósfera de sospecha, desconfianza, odio latente, prejuicios y violencia racial.

El estudio en línea muestra que la identificación por apariencia y trasfondo cultural funcionan bien como estrategias de discriminación y segregación y están firmemente anclada en las mentes de los europeos, sobre todo de los nordeuropeos. Especialmente la Unión Europea y los agentes sociales, como escuelas, universidades, empresas, etc., pero también la sociedad en su conjunto, deberían ser conscientes del problema y promover la cohesión social y europea de manera más decisiva.

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**Main Article**

НОВЕЙШИЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ В ЭТНОПОЛИТИКЕ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ТУРЦИИ (New Tendency in the Ethnopolitics of Contemporary Turkey)

Гюлер Калай (Güler Kalay)

Аннотация   Этнические проблемы продолжают занимать важное место во внутренней политике Турции. Хотя исторически давно существовала необходимость разрешения этнopolитических проблем для позитивного развития политического процесса Турецкой Республики, конкретное разрешение их не могло быть обеспечено до начала 21-ого века. С начала 2000-х годов в этнopolитике Турции появилась демократическая тенденция перехода от ассимиляции к мультикультурализму. В статье анализируются изменения в этнopolитике Турецкой Республики, прошедшие с 2004 г., а также подход Партии справедливости и развития – ПСР (АКР) к урегулированию курдского вопроса.

Ключевые слова: этнopolитика Турции, этнopolитика ПСР (АКР), курдский вопрос.

Summary in English  Ethnic problems continue to occupy an important
place in Turkey's domestic policy. Although historically there was a need to resolve ethno-political problems for the positive development of the political process of the Republic of Turkey, their specific resolution could not be provided until the beginning of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey's ethnic policy has seen a democratic transition from assimilation to multiculturalism. The article analyzes the changes in the ethnic policy of the Republic of Turkey since 2004, as well as the approach of the justice and development Party - AKP to the settlement of the Kurdish issue.

Key words: Turkey ethnic politics, ethno-politics of the AKP, the Kurdish question.

Конституция Турецкой Республики, которая является одним из типичных примеров унитарной государственной модели, признает всех тех, кто проживает в Турецкой Республике, как турок.\(^1\)

Определение этнического меньшинства официально не существует, и невозможно статистически определить этническое разнообразие, поскольку этническая принадлежность граждан не регистрируется. С помощью позднего турецкого национализма и этнократических элит был установлен ассимиляционный этнический режим, пытающийся создать однородное общество. В последний период Османской Империи прошла религиозная гомогенизация масс, которые в будущем будут составлять население Турции, но это не привело к этнической гомогенизации.\(^2\)
Начиная с 1923 года сотни тысяч иммигрантов из балканских стран, не являющиеся этническими турками, получили гражданство. Турецкая Республика, взявшая в качестве примера французскую модель государства, стала открыта для всех, кто живет в Турции и хочет называть себя турками.

Элита, создававшие Республику, и те, кто затем выступил за необходимость сохранения статус-кво против синдрома разделения, способствовали непрерывности развития ассимиляционного отношения режима на основе турецкого национализма с участием идеологов-кемалистов.

Поэтому стоит изучать этнополитическую историю Турции, обращая особое внимание на две важные этнические группы: курды, имеющие этническо-языковые проблемы, и этнически-сектантские алевиты.

В 2004 году начались передачи на курдском языке и четырех других языках меньшинств - арабском, боснийском, черкесском и зазаки, после чего в 2009 году был запущен государственный телеканал TRT 6, который транслировался на курдском языке.

Стоит отметить, что эта быстрая трансформация этнополитики турецкого государства произошла не от левых или социал-демократов, вопреки ожидаемому, а в период власти консервативных исламистов. В 1950-х годах, при многопартийном режиме Турции, были предприняты некоторые попытки изменить этнополитику государства, однако военный переворот 1980 года прервал на корню все эти попытки.
В течение этого периода социалисты и левые движения, которые занимают важное место в НРП (тур. CHP), пострадавших от антиэтнической политики государства, были в значительной степени уничтожены. В то время как исламистское движение Национальной селаметской партии Неджметтина Эрбакана было частично затронуто.

Фактически, армия не рассматривала ислам как проблему, в то время как турецко-исламский синтез отрицал курдскую идентичность. Мнение о том, что курды это лишь турки, забывшие о своем происхождении, стало вновь актуальным. Военная диктатура серьезно ударила по левым, что сделало невозможным внесение левыми изменений в этнополитику государства.

В 1989 году в отношении Социал-демократической Народной Партии - СНП (тур. SHP) суд государственной безопасности начал расследование. Причиной тому послужил доклад партии по курдской проблеме. Тем не менее, СНП и РНП, которые были в тот период основными левыми партиями, с 1990-х годов и до начала 2000-х годов систематически публиковали доклады, непосредственно связанные с курдским вопросом, и ставили этнополитическому проблему, используя курдских политиков.

СНП-РНП подчеркивали, что подход государства к курдскому вопросу «только как проблема безопасности» ошибочный, заявляя при этом об игнорировании таких ее аспектов, как «демократические права, гражданственность, уважение к самобытности и культуре и экономическое развитие».
В этот период линия СНП-РНП предлагала такие решения курдского вопроса, как:

- внедрение телерадиовещания и образования на курдском языке;
- устранение препятствий на пути к регистрации курдских имен в процессе поспортизации;
- комплексная реформа местного самоуправления;
- ликвидация системы сельских охранников и региональных губернаторств;
- закрытие судов государственной безопасности (DGM);
- развитие особых экономических программ для курдского региона;
- разработка новой конституции, которая привнесет понятие представительского и плюралистического руководства, перестанет считать мнение преступлением и устранение препятствий перед возвращением в села.

Одним из важнейших событий 1990-х годов является создание коалиции (Партии Истинного Пути, тур. DYP) ПИП-СНП. Премьер-министр Сулейман Демирель и заместитель премьер-министра Эрдал Иноню сошлись во мнении, что государство опоздало с решением проблемы юго-востока, а Демирель заявил, что разрыв между государством и курдским народом является результатом временного политического режима.

Лидеры подчеркивают, что коалиция ПИП-СНП является наилучшим шансом примирить государство и курдский народ. Они готовы дать и сделать все, но единственным условием является сохранение «унитарного государства».

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Иноню утверждает, что любой другой вариант, кроме унитарного государства приведет к гражданской войне.

Не будет преувеличением сказать, что военный переворот который был в 1980-ом году оказал прямое влияние на мобилизацию курдов, рост РПК (Рабочая Партия Курдистана, тур. PKK) и ее переход к вооруженным действиям. В этот период особенно тюрьма в городе. Диарбакыре стала для курдов символом. Организация совершила в 1984 году в районе Эрух свою первую вооруженную акцию и положила начало войне с турецким государством, которая будет продолжаться более 30 лет и приведет к упоминанию курдской идентичности в обществе в рамках восприятия безопасности.

Определенное влияние на исламское политическое движение оказалла умеренная ПНС, основанная в 1970-х годах. Она выступала за исламский мультикультурализм, против этнических проблем из-за критики ислама Кемализмом. В соответствии с этим, считаясь с этническим разнообразием, демонстрируя панисламический подход, она стремилась к объединению всего общества вокруг общего знаменателя, которым является ислам.

По мнению исламистов, причиной этнических проблем является секуляризм, а национализм, который по их мнению вызван секуляризмом, путем деления уммы становится причиной ненависти в обществе, особенно среди турок и курдов. Соответственно, конфликты, вызванные этническим разделением в многоязычном, многоэтническом мусульманском турецком...
обществе, могут быть решены под эгидой ислама. Благодаря этому была получена поддержка консервативных курдов. Эта поддержка помогла Неджметтину Эрбакану в период после переворота стать премьер-министром в 1996 году.

Конечно, вмешательство армии не заставило себя ждать и в 1997 году (процесс 28 февраля) он лишается власти в результате постмодернистского переворота. Основанная в 2001 году Р.Т. Эрдоганом, который с 70-х годов до этого времени занимал различные и развитие - ПСР (тур. AKP) приходит к власти на всеобщих выборах 2002 года должности в качестве члена ПНС и ПБ (Партия благодеяствия, тур. RP), Партия справедливости и с большой поддержкой от курдских регионов в восточной Анатолии.

Новые элиты, пришедшие к власти как субъект политического ислама с исламскими высказываниями об этнической и национальной принадлежности против кемализма, поддерживаются различными слоями общества, настроенными против кемализма.

Консервативные элиты, которые после процесса 28 февраля 1997 года подверглись либеральным изменениям, благодаря этому стали отвечать интересам не только исламского сегмента общества, но и либералов. Здесь обращают на себя внимание приверженцы «Второго республиканизма», которые на этапе политики государственности в экономике и политики националистической идентичности своими критическими
подходами к кемализму косвенно поддержали исламскую критику ПСР.

Исламская идеологическая инфраструктура, несомненно, была определяющим фактором в политике идентичности ПСР. Исламское многонациональное видение не ограничивается Турцей, а распространяется на Ближний Восток, Центральную Азию, Кавказ и Балканы. С созданием курдского автономного района на севере Ирака, исламисты в Турции перед лицом страха разделения турок и курдов, страха расчленения - «севрским синдромом» - предложили объединить всех турок и курдов и, таким образом, расширить границы Турции, включая при этом иракских курдов.

Ш. Кардаш и А. Балджы в своей работе 4 при изучении курдской проблемы как трилеммы безопасности между государством, курдским движением и политическими исламистами, определяют проблему как вопрос безопасности-иdenтичности-политики. В соответствии с этим, в период с 2009 по 2012 год в результате доминирования политической исламистской власти в гражданской и военной бюрократии государства, проблема снова вышла из тройной структуры и стала выражаться в виде дилеммы.

Утверждается, что отношения между представителями курдского движения и исламистов в этих рамках закрепились вокруг националистической оси, а взаимное недоверие и скрытое беспокойство по повестке дня являются доминирующим. Можно сказать, что это взаимное недоверие было усилено в период с...

Поскольку курдское движение представлено ДПН (Демократическая партия народов, тур. HDP) и РПК, санкционированное государством управления осуществлялось в регионе проживания курдов через структуру «Союз Сообществ Курдистана» (КСК). В настоящее время акценты сместились. Приоритетными стали не столько права, которые необходимо требовать от государства, а «самоуправление», которое следует установить в местах проживания курдов.

«Коллективное сознание», появившееся у курдов в 2013 году, как это выразилось в заявлении сопредседателя ДПН Селахаттина Демирташа: «Курдский адвокат и активист Тахира Эльчи убило не государство, а отсутствие государственности», указывает на другое развитие. Это развитие означает, что указанное сознание формируется вокруг конфликтов Кобани-Шенгала и «революции Рожава», а не из цивилизованной универсальности, упомянутой в контексте политики идентичности партии ПСР.

Тот факт, что идея превращения Курдистана, состоящего из четырех частей на географических территориях в Иране, Ираке, Сирии и Турции, в единый политический союз Курдистана, воплощена в определенной степени в курдском обществе в Турции из-за событий в Сирии, привел к самому основному кризису универсализма и консервативной демократии Партии справедливости и развития.
Однако в нынешней ситуации курдская политика как Партии Справедливости и Развития, так и различных групп, которые составляют ее общественные низы и блок власти, формируются в основном вокруг религиозных высказываний.

Можно сказать, что события особенно после инцидента в части Улудере города Шырнака и некоторые последующие инциденты, столкнувшие курдских граждан с государством и правительством, а также конфликты, которые продолжались после выборов 7 июня 2015 года, отрицательно сказались на позиции, популярности ПСР со стороны курдов и доверительных отношениях между партией ПСР и курдами.

Согласно исследованию, проведенному на основе опроса 136 человек из юго-восточных провинций в период конфликта, который начался после выборов 7 июня 2015 года, и опубликованному в феврале 2016 года, 57,8% респондентов возлагают ответственность за окончание «процесса решения» на государство и правительственную политику.

Большинство участников пришли к выводу, что они считают и РПК, и ДПН, а также правительство, неискренними в отношении процесса урегулирования. С другой стороны, такая важная часть, как 67,6%, считает, что политика траншей и баррикад неверна, а 59,5% считают, что самоуправление невозможно установить таким образом. Только 23,5% респондентов считают, что траншеи являются естественным результатом политического тупика.
Опять же, очень значительное большинство (70%) участников также считают, что правительство допустило ошибку в период 2013-2015 годов, когда была создана инфраструктура для окопов и баррикад или что они закрывали на это глаза, чтобы втянуть РПК в войну. Среди участников исследования 88,2 % сказали, что «и государство, и РПК наносят ущерб ни в чем не повинным людям, и что необходимо прекратить и террористические акты, и военные действия».

Этот поразительный результат показывает, что перенос Рабочей партией Курдистана войны в городские центры, создал серьезный дискомфорт и вызвал негативную реакцию у жителей региона. В то же время, акцент правительства в течение данного процесса на необходимость в самое короткое время обеспечить общественный порядок и безопасность, совпал с тем, что это возмущение в регионе достигло очень высокого уровня (Янмыш, 2016).

Вместе с риторикой «Курдская весна» в период 2013-2015 годов, следует отметить тот факт, что курды Турции, помимо перспективы «турцинизации» через ДПН, также направились к перспективе, названной курдскими националистами «курдистанизацией». Реальность «курдистанизации» воплощена в результате развития за последние 2-3 года среди курдов Турции идеи четырех частей Курдистана. Таким образом, в ходе проведенных полевых исследований установлено, что даже слова Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана «Кобани вот-вот падет» были поняты по-разному и расценены как фактор, который окончательно завершил процесс урегулирования (Янмыш, 2016: 22-28). 7
Как видно из данных результатов, курдское население в этом регионе в значительной степени выступает против политики окопов и баррикад, и самым важным приоритетом является немедленное восстановление общественного порядка и предотвращение человеческих потерь. Тем не менее, по-прежнему значительная часть населения в пределах 20-30 %, которая считает, что политика траншей и окопов является результатом политического тупика.

В сложившейся ситуации в Турции прилагаются усилия по разработке государственной модели мультикультурализма, включающей такие элементы, как религия, этническая принадлежность и религиозные направления (конфессии). С другой стороны, модель постсекулярного общества подразумевает не такое государственное моделирование, а скорее взаимодействие между различными слоями населения, взаимное признание и в результате формирование совместного гражданства.

Однако в политике Партии Справедливости и Развития бывают случаи, когда делаются высказывания о единстве посредством определенных культурных символов по вопросам определенного признания алевитской и курдской идентичности и требованиям некоторых прав, но не даются ответы, как конкретно предоставить эти права. С приходом к власти «не поддавшейся секуляризации» части общества Турции, предпринимаются попытки по реорганизации публичной видимости религии.

Поэтому «понимание секуляризма новой Турции» на самом деле
стоит перед лицом опасности превращения в смысловую конструкцию, имеющую противоположное значение. Консервативная демократическая идентичность Партии справедливости и развития, делающей акцент на «общую цивилизацию как коллективное сознание», в то же время несет в себе риск превращения в более репрессивную и однотипную модель.

Если говорить о действительно постсекулярном обществе, продолжение пути с общественной моделью, которая будет формировать новую идентичность и рамки гражданства, а не с гомогенизирующей политикой, являющейся новой версией концепции, которая старается переформировать общество используя идеологию секуляризма, приведет к более здоровому развитию.

Хабермас в своей работе, рассматривающей отношения между светским либеральным государством и религией, подчеркнул завершающий процесс обучения, который вносит свой вклад в дискуссии на общественном уровне, расцениваемые им в качестве неотъемлемого требования. (Habermas, 2005: 347).

Если говорить о действительно постсекулярном обществе, то надо реализовывать общественную модель, которая будет формировать новую идентичность и гражданское общество, а не проводить гомогенизирующую политику, использующей идеологию секуляризма. Хабермас в своей работе рассматривая отношения между светским, либеральным государством и религией,
подчеркнул важность процесса обучения, который способствует общественным дискуссиям и являющихся обязательным для формирования новой идентичности.  

Алевитские конференции и формирование «Комитета мудрецов», осуществлявшие деятельность в процессе урегулирования конфликтов, с точки зрения их организации и содержания показали, что этот процесс обучения не стал достаточно плураллистичным, чтобы способствовать выполнению этой задачи.

В настоящее время нельзя сказать, что конфликты вокруг религии, являющейся важным фактором, определяющим политику в таких областях, как мультикультурализм и плюрализм в Турции, имеют постсекулярную структуру по Хабермасу.

Политику идентичности, которая в эпоху правления партии справедливости и развития колеблется между демократической инициативой и проектом национального единства и братства и не может никак войти на свою орбиту, можно рассматривать как выражение этой двусмысленности, относящейся к новому гегемонистскому блоку.

Таким образом, нет ничего более естественного в ситуации, когда в турецком обществе, которое не является продолжением светско-либеральной модели общества, ПСР не смогла установить постсекулярные рамки. Исторический опыт управления идентичностями и различиями основан как раз на разных предпосылках. Нецелесообразно осуждать нынешнюю модель,
которая исторически не базируется на модели светско-либерального общества и, следовательно, на сегодняшний день не закрепленная в пост-секулярных рамках, как авторитарную государственную модель.

Политика идентичности, которую партия ПСР стремится заново построить, переопределила новые рамки идентичности, опирающиеся на религиозные высказывания вокруг мусульманской, курдской идентичности и идентичности алевитов, и приняла подход, основанный на включении/преобразовании, определении и признании в этих рамках.

Похоже, что этот новый стиль политики создания цивилизации через коллективное сознание, допускает форму установления преобразующего доминирования, имеющего долгосрочное функционирование и способное привести к прочному согласию.

Таким образом, в отличие от всех предыдущих инициатив, Партия Справедливости и Развития связала решение проблемы с более широким общественно-политическим процессом, инициировала общественно-политические дебаты, создав напряжение в отношении институционального альянса.

Сразу после прихода к власти Партия справедливости и развития осуществила радикальные реформы, такие как упразднение чрезвычайного положения, закрытие судов государственной безопасности, открытие курсов курдского языка, осуществление серьезных экономических инициатив, ведущих к позитивной дискриминации, создание института живых языков и запуск
канала TRT 6. Однако эти радикальные шаги не могут полностью решить этнополитическую проблему на данном этапе и что данный вопрос принимает все более запутанный вид.

Приоритетной политикой в современной Турции должно быть, прежде всего, установление демократического урегулирования этнополитических конфликтов, удовлетворяющего культурные права и права личности, а не идеология сепаратизма, самоуправления и федерализма, которые могут быть вызваны привлекательностью достижений курдского населения в Ираке и Сирии.

Это урегулирование должно быть не только юридически основано на конституционном гражданстве, но и осуществляться на основе социальной принадлежности. Процесс урегулирования следует рассматривать не только циклически из-за перспективы членства в ЕС или событий в Сирии и Ираке, но и с долгосрочной точки зрения.

Урегулирование курдского вопроса важно с точки зрения политических реформ, которые требуются во многих областях: от индигенизации до установления правового государства, от экономического роста до разработки социальной политики, направленной на защиту женщин и против убийств «во имя чести».

Это урегулирование может быть осуществлено, прежде всего, путем создания культурных прав на основе конституционного
гражданства, где преобладает процессуальное право. Поверхностная и дискурсивная практика, которая блокирует процесс урегулирования и делает напрасными общественные ожидания от урегулирования, не приводит ни к чему иному, кроме как к осложнению проблемы и увеличению отчуждения.

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Praise for ‘Ethnopolitics of Turkey’

(Critical Response to Güler Kalay’s “New Tendency in the Ethnopolitics of Contemporary Turkey”)

I find the author's article highly interesting. Essentially the author's analysis concerns the Islamic multinational vision, and is focused more broadly in the research—not just limited to the situation in Turkey, but including also an analysis on how it impacts the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. That is why this is article has a high significance for all the mentioned regions.

- Anonymous

NB: do you have any comments on Kalay's article a/o the critical response? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.
Main Article

Resisting Neoliberalism on the Local Level: Indigenous Development through the Zapatista Movement

Dulce Gonzalez, with Badriyya Yusuf & Naomi Happychuk

“They were not separatists. They were not even a guerrilla, ‘a fish that swims in the sea of the people’, as defined by Che Guevara, a revolutionary group seeking popular support to take power. They were born as a collective decision of hundreds of communities who had no interest in conquering it. They were the sea, not the fish” (Harvey 2014: 39).

This essay concerns a modified, improved version of a paper originally written in March 2014 for the ‘Indigenous Peoples, Globalization and Development’ MA course at the University of Winnipeg, Canada; Dulce Gonzalez—incidentally one of our new assistant editors—intends to submit a major update of the essay in due course, to be published in one of the future issues of our journal.

Introduction

It has been asserted that neoliberalism is a hegemonic force, which cannot be escaped, and neoliberal ideology is closed and bereft of
alternatives (Khasnabish 2008: 166). It is defined as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005: 8).

Neoliberalism is largely viewed as powerful, expanding and inevitable (Bohle 2006: 57; Yeates 2002: 69) and commonly associated with globalization and development (Campbell & Petersen 2001: 51; Harvey 2005: 7). As the destructive impacts of neoliberalism become gradually more apparent, particularly for poor and minority groups, the possibility of alternatives to neoliberalism is increasingly important. The rise and impact of the Zapatista Movement in Mexico is evidence that there are local responses which have the potential to offer alternatives to neoliberalism.

After nearly a decade of struggle, the Zapatista’s uprising became public in January of 1994 with the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation National (EZLN)’s declaration of war on the Mexican government and the seizure of four towns (Van der Haar 2001: 188). This coincided with Mexico’s signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and transition to a more market-based economy, which was seen as a direct threat to Indigenous livelihoods through the introduction of dominating international market competition.

The EZLN based their constitutional right to declare war on the Mexican state on Article 39 of the country’s Constitution, which states that “National sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is
to help the people, [and that] the people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government" (Safransky & Wilford 2011: 15). Under this line, the EZLN issued a list of eleven demands addressed to the government based on work, land, housing, food, healthcare, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace (Jung 2003: 24).

The Zapatista Movement has challenged the traditional roles of the state, society and the market, and has exposed the conditions of poverty and marginalization under which much of Mexico’s Indigenous peoples live in addition to the political exclusion which keep them from enjoying full citizenship (Safransky & Wilford 2011: 4; Van der Haar 2001: 99).

This paper will illustrate how the Zapatista Movement is a local response to the resistance of neoliberalism, evident through the transformed enviro-political, social and economic systems of the EZLN. While it is worth noting the challenges and limitations of this Movement, one should conclude that through fostering self-determination and spurring similar uprisings and deliberation regarding alternatives to neoliberalism, the Zapatista Movement is a fundamental, insightful and inspiring example of the existence of local alternatives to neoliberalism which can foster Indigenous development.

Environmental Politics and Indigenous Rights

One of the primary catalysts of the Zapatista Movement was around
issues of environmental politics. The Mexican government’s signing of NAFTA brought challenges not only to the land-based livelihoods of the Indigenous peoples but also to their communal land system, adding to issues around the lack of available productive land and political reorganization of the communities which persisted since the 1960s (Harvey 1998: 8; Safransky & Wilford 2011: 15).

One of the most significant effects of the Zapatista Movement therefore, was enabling the acquisitions of lands, as land occupations were a primary part of the insurgent’s agenda (Van der Haar 2001: 188-189). The Zapatista Revolutionary Agrarian Law (Ley Agraria Revolutionaria Zapatista) stipulated very strict limits on the quantity of land that can be held in private tenancy as well as it was advocated that land redistributed to landless peasants and farmworkers be worked collectively (Lynn 2002: 153):

“All tracts of land that are more than 100 hectares of poor quality and fifty hectares of good quality will be subject to revolutionary agrarian action... The lands affected by this agrarian law will be redistributed to landless peasants and farm workers who apply for it as collective property for the formation of cooperatives, peasants’ societies, or farm and ranching collectives. The land affected must be worked collectively” (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 1994).

Thus while many families joined the movement as a way to acquire some land, many others fled their communities fearing the Zapatista army, the Mexican army, or both. There were other peasants wishing to
be included in the land agreements, primarily young men without land rights of their own.

In effect, the EZLN's agrarian law was not so different from the official land reform legislation of the Mexican government, and was in fact modelled on it. Despite that, people who joined the Movement felt that “…Zapata’s name historically justified their demand for continued redistribution of land and that their detailed outline of collective production techniques, which focused on satisfying the primary needs of people would promote national well-being” (Lynn 2002: 153).

Like the official land reform legislation, the revolutionary law sets criteria for the liability of private properties (though it is set considerably lower), allowing some land to be retained by the landowner, defining who may be considered beneficiaries of land reform and determining how the land should be used. This was an indicator that the Zapatista’s conception of land tenure was largely influenced by the Mexican state (Van der Haar 2001: 188-189). In fact, land reform through the Zapatista Movement was not a new solution to issues of land acquisition in Mexico.

The government's *ejido* (Indian community lands) system widely initiated in the 1940s was a means of land reform, which served to expropriate land from wealthy landlords for communal agricultural use, until it was eliminated in the early 1990s as a result of “low productivity” in favour of enabling ownership of the land (Schmidt & Gruben 1992: 2). Then, the *ejido* collective plots were commonly bought and sold, aligned with a market-based economy.
Therefore, the Zapatista Movement brought a *re-emergence* of land reform, beyond the limits set by the state, based on unsatisfied demands for land, rather than old, mishandled ones (Van der Haar 2001: 204-205). Because the state's land reform bureaucracy was what protected land rights, its elimination and thus failure to resolve incomplete endowments and lasting conflicts became an issue of state legitimacy; where people could not rely on the state they no longer felt to be bound to its laws (Ibid: 207).

The Zapatista's land reform differed from that of the successive Mexican governments through its Maoist influence which emphasized collective ownership, by limiting the ability of the Mexican state to regulate land tenure, and by reframing the issue as one of Indigenous rights, drawing the support of Indigenous movements globally (Van der Haar 2001: 190, 207 & 210).

The limits of neoliberal land policies, emphasizing titling and privatization, have become increasingly clear beyond the Zapatista Movement, inciting greater support for communal tenure systems. The expanding role of non-state actors in land tenure regulation has been supported by broader trends towards decentralization and recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples (Van der Haar 2001: 264).

Through striving for just compensation for the extraction of natural resources on Indigenous land and for political autonomy, the Zapatista's land reform was much more than land distribution, but rather “a conscious rethinking [reforming] of development on the land in order to privilege social justice, economic development, ecological
sustainability, and the local community” (Baum 2011: 1), or what has otherwise been called “land sovereignty” (Safransky & Wolford 2011: 3). The Zapatista Movement has therefore been characterized as “a radical political critique of representative democracy [which] provides both a conceptual apparatus and a grounded model for how we might think and do politics differently, in [which] autonomy is self-governance” (Ibid: 15).

Through the Zapatista Movement, land occupation became framed in an ethnic discourse in terms of “recovering the lands of our ancestors” which were impacted by state-led redistribution (Van der Haar 2001: 205-206). This was likely an important factor in the success of the Zapatista Rebellion in acquiring communal land since 1994, as emphasizing the link between culture and land challenges individualist notions of neoliberalism and can effectively promote self-determination and Indigenous rights (Engle 2010: 163-164).

Important to note then is the fact that ethnic identity of the Zapatistas is not merely related to language and clothing but also to politics, including the “the experience of discrimination, political exclusion and government abuse” (Van der Haar 2001: 231). This correlates with international frameworks (including the United Nations) in which Indigenous identity corresponds with the experience of colonialism (United Nations 2004: 2-3). In the case of this movement itself, it “restructure[d] people's identifications" through the land reforms, and thus “produced community” (Van der Haar 2001: 259). This implies that the impacts of the Zapatista Movement are profound, extending beyond the tangible to the philosophical realm; penetrating ideas, values, beliefs and particularly the identity of landless peasants.
Subsequently faced with an impasse in the peace talks with the Mexican government, the EZLN has created 38 autonomous municipalities, known as the \textit{Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas} (MAREZ), in English the Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities, ruled by their own forms of government akin to their Indigenous ancestors of the past (SIPA\textsc{z} 2012: 1).

These autonomous municipalities have proven to be legitimate and effective means of governance, though they are not without their challenges and criticisms. While elected representatives coordinate the municipalities, they have been characterized as a “fractured and diverse” landscape of autonomy, “with various projects of autonomy overlapping and assuming different characteristics in different regions,” illustrating the challenges that come with community-level autonomy (Van der Haar 2001: 211).

Additionally, the autonomous municipalities are sometimes viewed as an imposition from the military command of the EZLN which creates “a great deal of tension in practice”, as people are forced to make heavy contributions to the EZLN military structure, and at times feel “caught between two armies [the EZLN and the Mexican governments’], trying to please both, yet not knowing who would eventually win” (Van der Haar 2001: 232).

Despite these criticisms, the Zapatista Movement became an important symbol in the disputes over the Mexican national project, in the defence of Indigenous rights, and in struggles “against neo-liberalism” (Van der Haar 2001: 187).
Social Development and Indigenous Rights

Like millions of Indigenous peoples in different continents, Mexican Indigenous peoples demand rights to cultural self-determination. They insist on the right to live according to the local practices and customs to develop self-governance. For example, as part of their demand for recognition as collective units, they fought for the inclusion of the term *pueblo*—‘peoples’—instead of ‘people’ in the Constitution (Jung 2003: 1). Their claims for collective rights include the right to local and regional autonomy, bilingual education and communal land as the basis of the cultural reproduction of the group (Ibid). This has had profound effects on the Zapatista education and health systems and was a significant motivator of international support.

On August 8th of 2003 the Zapatistas announced the transformation of *Aguascalientes*, a space for dialogue with the civil society leading to the birth of *Caracoles*, the autonomous areas of which the MAREZ are part of, and the *Junta del Buen Gobierno* (board of good governance), bringing in effect the San Andres Accords of 1994 (Harvey 2014: 39).

There are five *Caracoles* for each of the five geographic and ethnic zones, which are civilian centers with autonomous government (Ramonet 2001: 1). They constitute a political and territorial body covering several autonomous municipalities and regions. The supreme governing body is the *Junta del Buen Gobierno*, which is appointed by the autonomous councils (Cuevas 2007: 7-8).

The Zapatista worldview, viewing *Caracoles* as seashells which can “help their ears to hear even the most distant words”, enabled them to
dialogue with the Mexican government, resulting in the San Andres Accords which committed the Mexican government to “recognize a number of Indigenous rights in the fields of, among others, forms of social and political organization, the election of local authorities, the administration of justice, management of resources, [and] land tenure and cultural development…” (Van der Haar 2001: 99).

The Zapatista members intended to practice interculturalism in bringing about the possibility of dialogue. Interculturalism has potentially radical implications for changing society for the better, through strengthening identity by drawing on ideas from other cultures while at the same time autonomy can provide the political space to make this happen (Gow 2008: 143).

The four key elements which distinguish the Sistema de Educación Rebelde Autónomo Zapatista (SERAZ), in English, Zapatista Autonomous Rebellious Education System, from conventional Mexican public education, are the intercultural ideology, the recovery of language and identity as a form of decolonization, the institutionalization of local knowledge within an education system, and use of the concept of promotores. The promotores must have an ethnic origin due to their activist role as they serve as transmitters and drivers of the social, cultural and political aspirations of the ethnic group of origin (Baronnet 2012: 1).

SERAZ, formerly ‘The Other Education’, was locally developed under the Indigenous worldviews of the region, promoting cultural diversity rather than using ‘western’ mono-cultural views (Baronnet 2011: 1). The autonomous Zapatista schools have played a very important role in
promoting intercultural education in a pluri-cultural country (Ibid: 21). The schools, named *Semillita del Sol* (Little Seed of the Sun), have a multi-level component in which community Elders teach the youth, ensuring their education includes Indigenous history, language and culture, which can support livelihoods within the community as opposed to emigration of former students away from their communities, as occurred through the state education system (Ibid: 177).

Hence, there is a particular emphasis on community and collective work. While studying, students under the SERAZ system also learn how to grow gardens for self-sustenance, how to produce crops and how to raise animals, thus learning practical knowledge while earning an income to support their families (Baronnet 2011: 177).

In terms of language and identity, the most important aspect for the Zapatista members has been the recovery of cultural values, the ways of speaking and understanding each other within communities through focusing on teaching and learning in their native languages, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal and Chol, among others (Baronnet 2011: 42).

Therefore, SERAZ has become an opportunity to appreciate, rescue and nurture the Indigenous communities’ identity and wisdom, in which the values of community and environmental reciprocity are more important than competition and consumption. This Indigenous institutionalization of local knowledge within the education system additionally serves as a platform for resistance, strengthening the “actions that counter the dominant development discourse and practice” (Gow 2008: 138).
According to the Zapatista model of developing autonomous services such as schools, health clinics and agricultural programs, they rely on the training and services of *promotores* (EZLN 1993: 1). As explained by Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, known as Sub-Commander Marcos, today named as Sub-Commander Galeano, who was the spokesperson for the Zapatista Movement, the term *promotores* is used to describe individual roles within the Zapatista system, as opposed to titles such as “*doctor*” (doctor) or “*maestro*” (professor) which is viewed as hierarchical (Baronnet 2011: 24; Harvey 2014: 45).

The use of *promotores* as a means of resisting all forms of government support, led to the expulsion of government-paid teachers, resulting in arguments and criticisms from some community members regarding the quality of education their children were receiving (Harvey 2014: 43).

Furthermore, the *promotores* had families of their own and complained that it was impossible for them to attend both the school and their field-work. Thus the “anti-government discourse... conceals some of the difficult choices people face and the costs involved in rejecting government assistance” (Van der Haar, 2001: 232).

Despite the developed autonomy of the SERAZ, the autonomous education system, it is not officially recognized by the Mexican Government and therefore lacks support from the state and other entities, resulting in significant resources challenges including lack of teaching materials and adequate infrastructure (Baronnet 2011: 227-230). This is matched by a lack of qualified community members with ample knowledge of Indigenous traditions and language, to be
employed as *promotores*.

The excessive demands on *promotores*, including full time service with minimal means of compensation or support, make it challenging for these community members to maintain decent livelihoods (Howard 2007: 1). The prominence of oral teachings in Indigenous culture further adds challenges to developing necessary written materials, and arguments have been made that the SERAZ education system may be misguided by external ideologies (Baronnet 2012: 24; Harvey 2014: 48).

The absence of proper policies to protect traditional knowledge and support autonomous Indigenous education, is underscored by a lack of recognition for Indigenous knowledge and wisdom by the Mexican government. Despite these weaknesses and challenges, the SERAZ has become a paramount element of the Zapatista Movement, fostering self-determination for the Zapatista communities (Baronnet 2011: 326).

The Autonomous Zapatista Health System, in Spanish, *El Sistema de Salud Autónomo Zapatista* (SSAZ), forms part of the EZLN’s political project for autonomy, in which it interacts with and links directly to living conditions, housing, nutrition, labour, justice, education—all part of the EZLN’s eleven demands (Cuevas 2007: 6). Zapatista healthcare is provided for free (with the exception of medicines) regardless of religious or political affiliations, or participation in the Zapatista Movement (Ibid: 7).

Each community participating in the health programme is however required to follow the SSAZ structure, comprised of a health coordinating committee, which includes representatives of health
outreach workers within each municipal council, with significant dependence on community members acting as health workers (Cuevas 2007: 7-8).

The government health system differs substantially from that of the SSAZ. Participation in the national system is not voluntary, but linked to other economic benefits for education and health; yet the government’s health services do not adequately support communities situated in remote areas, and care is not free of charge and cost recovery is utilized (Cuevas 2007: 7-8). Despite those differences and the declaration of resistance, the SSAZ interacts with the Mexican National Health System, referring patients to this system for more demanding, secondary or tertiary treatment (Ibid: 11).

Furthermore, the SSAZ model has been criticized for excluding traditional Indigenous health practices, which have historically been “a key element in the survival of the community and a fundamental element of identity” (Cuevas 2007: 11). Participation of traditional health agents, including ‘hueseros’, ‘curanderos’, ‘iloles’, and ‘hierberos’, has been limited with the exception of midwives who may still assist with childbirths (Ibid). Overall, however, this model has had a significant impact on the primary level of health care which the Zapatista(-controlled) communities receive, as compared to that which they received under the Mexican government’s health system (Ibid: 12).

Another significant aspect of the Zapatista’s strategy to strengthen their anti-systemic political movement has been the organization of national and international networks garnering global support and
international media recognition (see further section ‘Media Communications and Strategies’). To begin with, the media gave the Zapatista Movement the support and credibility they needed be taken seriously by the government, forcing President Ernesto Zedillo to negotiate with the EZLN (Baum 2011: 1). Therefore, “[t]his negotiating power, although not allowing the EZLN to achieve the desired change in the constitution, allowed them to achieve or at least move towards many of their goals” (Ibid).

In addition, the international support helped to finance partial investments of autonomous social programs concentrated on education and health. For instance, by 2013 funding had been invested in the construction and maintenance of four new, autonomous secondary schools and training centers for promotores (Baronnet 2012: 187).

Despite the important role of support from the international community and the attention of the media, the online activism encountered setbacks. After twenty years of the campaign, international financial support stagnated. The EZLN also suffered from disagreements among a division of supporters, which is a common flaw of online activism (Baum 2011: 1).

The lack of access to technology and knowledge limited some of the Indigenous communities to participate in the online movement. Although this meant that they were dependent on their local leaders with access to this source of support, the Zapatista members resolved this by hosting offline events. “This movement to offline communication was extremely popular and successful, strengthening
relationships and allowing the inclusion of those on the wrong side of the digital divide” (Baum 2011: 1). Overall, the unique social systems of the Zapatista Movement distinguished them from the Mexican government’s neoliberal-based models, and were influential in their ability to attain economic development.

Economic Development and Indigenous Rights

It has been argued that the dominance of modern economics led to the appropriation, suppression and overlooking of other economic models (Escobar 1995: 62). Still, a number of local responses to mainstream capitalism do exist, with differing emphasis on property ownership, eco-technology, economies of scale, agency of coordination, scope of the market and cross-border trade (Park 2011: 67).

Examples of these models include but are not limited to the eco-capitalist globalization movement, solidarity economy movement, nation-state centric localization models, degrowth subsistence economy model, socialist planning model, eco-socialist model and the anarcho-communist model (Park 2011: 66; Brysk 2000: 178).

However, these competing local models “are discussed only within a few activist milieu[s] and rarely trigger constructive criticisms or serious debates from academics” (Park 2011: 66). The Zapatista rebellion challenged that when it made global history for its rejection of capitalism at a time of widespread economic crisis and disillusionment with representative democracy (Tucker 2014: 1). It changed the discourse of Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty from being
an unspeakable issue in Latin America (Engle 2010: 57), to one that embodies autonomy which is not simply cultural, but economic and political as well (Ibid: 94).

During the 1950s and 60s, the local state of Chiapas experienced an economic boom that would later have an impact on political mobilization in the national state (Khasnabish 2008: 102). It was considered the agricultural heartland of southern Mexico for its cattle ranching and the large production of export crops such as coffee, corn, cacao, tobacco, sugar, fruit, vegetables and honey. It was also a key state for the nation's petrochemical and hydroelectric industries (Garcia 2006: 54).

However, it was largely the interests of the elite—large landowners, plantation owners and politicians—that were served by extensive agrarian reforms and a paternalistic, corporatist state (Khanabish 2008: 101). The Reform of Indian Community Lands (ejidos) created communities which depended on the state for credit, material assistance and amplification of original land grants through the 1980s and early 1990s (Ibid).

The socio-economic landscape of most Latin American countries in the mid-1980s was characterized by systemic pauperization resulting from the global consolidation of capitalism. This was largely experienced through the deployment of structural adjustment programs, privatization of productive and financial sectors, the removal of subsidies and market protections, and free trade (Vasquez-Leon 2010: 7; Escobar 1995: 22). For Mexico, a widespread economic
crisis further led to the withdrawal of external government assistance, which resulted in lost economic protections for production cooperatives as state subsidies; thus, export, tax privileges and basic social services were eliminated.

Specifically, the privatization of the State Coffee Marketing Association and collapse in world coffee prices resulted in a drop of peasant incomes by 70 per cent (Brysk 2000: 151). Another outcome was the massive rural-to-urban migration and abandonment of farmland exacerbated by population and migratory pressures of economic modernization (Ibid).

These concerns, as well as the growing contradictions between the neoliberal model and the claim to social rights, strengthened the idea of social or solidarity economies, and other local alternatives to mainstream international development and trade (Vasquez-Leon 2010: 7; Brysk 2000: 145).

The transformative effect facing a free trade agreement, a “death certificate” for Indigenous farmers

The EZLN was created out of these socio-economic and socio-cultural concerns. The uprising which shook the world was timed to coincide with the launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. It was a direct protest to the concessions as terms for entrance into the NAFTA agreement and its promotion (Engle 2010: 112). Sub-Commander Marcos termed NAFTA as a “death certificate” for Indigenous farmers (Ibid: 302) in poverty stricken Chiapas, on the
The premise that it would force the farmers to compete with cheaper imports. It also amounted to having their constitutional rights to communal land being revoked.

Almost 54 percent of the Chiapas land was designated as communally owned; but the reformed Article 27 of the Constitution, which allowed for the ejidos to be purchased by corporations and foreign investors (Torok 2009: 15) and a backlog of unresolved land titles, were threats to their security (Brysk 2000: 151).

The Zapatista communities of Chiapas have had a profound impact on international trade, demonstrating that local responses can have an impact on neo-liberalism (Torok 2009: ix). Central to this discussion is the transformative effect of the Zapatista Movement’s quest for cultural autonomy on mainstream capitalism by way of embedding and promoting social values, procedures and benefits through the fair trade movement. What is particularly noteworthy of the Zapatista Movement is its ability to bypass a number of the constraints of the existing neoliberal system that exclude small-scale producers from mainstream and added-value markets (Brysk 2000: 145).

The main idea behind solidarity economies is that the quality of life is included as a measure of economic efficiency, and not merely profitability (Vasquez-Leon 2010: 7). In other words, moral economies are used to “make profit with a purpose” thereby challenging the international logic of profit (Brysk 2000: 143).

Although most cooperatives and alternative development schemes work within the systems they seek to change, the Zapatista Movement
is different in that it has clearly been a departure from the existing legal and institutional order (Vasquez-Leon 2010: 8). For them, the quest of seeking Indigenous rights, recognition and dignity provided a means to socially embed new rules, norms and procedures into international trade by using the cultural significance of land (Brysk, 2000: 159). This involved the use of traditional knowledge through organic agriculture in Chiapas and the certification of production (Torok 2009: 9).

To assess specifically how economic activity in Chiapas impacted international trade, requires the examination of two main factors. Firstly, the power of communications networks, the media and its corresponding increase in creating global consciousness of social issues and problems; and secondly, the influence of fair trade as promoted in south Mexico.

Participating in fair trade allowed the Zapatista to further contradict the free market relations, which are based on buyers seeking the lowest prices rather than on building “long-term human relationships” (Schulz 1988: 31). As such, the coffee trade in Chiapas has been recognized as a unique approach to sustainable development through the use of identity politics and cultural autonomy (Torok 2009: 9).

Media Communication and Strategies

The Zapatista’s ability to communicate beyond borders allowed for the creation of a communication praxis whereby linkages were established between Indigenous peasants in the remote jungles of Chiapas, to
audiences in Mexico City, New York, Toronto, Berlin, Milan, Paris and Sydney among many other places (Schulz 1998: 31). Their use of transnational support and information networks, termed as ‘Zapatista in Cyberspace’ (Brysk 2000: 160), enabled them to provide a platform for discussing alternatives to market economies by hosting an international conference—the First Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism (Ibid).

In this sense, the Zapatista Movement allowed for questioning of the asymmetrical costs of free trade in its impact of low wages, unemployment and reduced sovereignty (Stiglitz 2006: 62). It could also be argued that the Zapatista’s media prowess contributed to the growth of Western and environmentally conscientious consumers as evidenced by the increased volume of fair trade coffee, as a portion of global coffee market transactions and the reassessment of the roles of ecology and cultural sustainability in economics (Torok 2009: 4, Pierotti 2011: 13). This not only provided the Zapatista Movement with the ability to maintain financial independence and reject handouts from the state, but also contributed to the promotion of ethical standards such as eco-labeling and social benefits in the negotiation processes of conventional markets.

Although it could be claimed that the Zapatista members have attained economic autonomy, challenges still remain. Poverty is still a problem in the region and is exacerbated by vulnerability to economic pressures, as well as fluctuations in the global market and of aid from sympathizers, an underperforming economy and the drug war. Despite its limitations, the Zapatista Movement has been cited as an inspiration for subsequent social movements opposing socio-economic
inequality, financial greed and corruption, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement.

Conclusion

In essence, any model, “whether local or universal, is a construction of the world and not an indisputable, objective truth of it” (Escobar 1995: 62). Although he contextualizes this observation in the field of economic analysis, it could be applied to social constructivism in general.

This is reinforced by Richard Stahler-Sholk’s observation that the Zapatista Movement, despite being a significant example of movement resistance to neoliberalism, has several inherent limitations including what he coins the ‘neoliberal multiculturalism trap’. This implies the situation whereby the same nation-states that oversee economic liberalization and privatization “establish themselves as arbiters of the boundary between individual and group rights, carefully circumscribing the latter to exclude challenges to class-based inequalities” (Stahler-Sholk 2007: 52).

In other words, when all is said and done, the (nation-)state still maintains its neoliberal stance. This can further be illustrated by the fact that the only issue that led to a signed agreement between the Zapatista and the government was that of negotiations over Indigenous rights and culture, which led to the San Andres Accords of 1996, which conceded state recognition of Indigenous decision-making authority.
Nevertheless, that victory for the Zapatista was short-lived because the implementation legislation was delayed and even replaced by a contentious brand of *neoindigesmo*, which the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Indigenous questions decried as a violation of International Labour Organization Rule (ILO) Provision 169 (Stahler-Sholk 2007: 52).

What this illustrates is that drastic measures are required for the Chiapas regions to be politically autonomous. It would necessitate making changes to the Mexican Constitution and political change, which has not been forthcoming (Baum 2011: 1). Unfortunately, while the Zapatista may have overcome political exclusion, the challenge still lies in transforming the entire system (Brysk 2000: 162).

The Zapatista Movement was more of a non-violent social-movement than a guerrilla insurgency. It never sought to overthrow the government, but to rebuild the system from the bottom up as is evidenced in their popular refrain *mandar obedeciendo*, which means “the people give the orders and the government obeys” (Stahler-Sholk 2007: 52).

Then, it raises the question about the sustainability of the Zapatista economic model: does this model bear consideration in determining its viability as a possible local alternative to neoliberalism? According to Arturo Escobar, “local models exist not in a pure state, but in complex hybridizations with dominant models” (Escobar 1995: 96). This brings back the question of whether neoliberalism can in fact be circumvented, let alone defeated.
Despite the recognition that cooperatives and alternative marketing networks have the potential to challenge the status quo on behalf of the “legitimate interests” of the peasantry, critics have charged that the cooperative movement inevitably fails to deliver on its promises of participation, equity, solidarity and social transformation (Park 2011: 66).

Further, critics observe that alternative economies in capitalist societies abandon their role as social movements so as to become better integrated into the dominant capitalist system. For example, Alison Brysk identifies the Otavalos of Mexico as having expressed a preference for the pursuit of economic success over political mobilization. This has resulted in increased community inequalities, disappearance of cottage industries and cultural attenuation (Brysk 2000: 177).

The petrochemical and hydroelectric industries in the Chiapas region also add to more questions regarding the Zapatista’s quest for self-determination. Richard Stahler-Sholk identifies “autonomy without resources” as a potential pitfall of a territorial autonomy (Stahler-Sholk 2007: 50). He describes this as a process whereby protagonists are bottled up in a spatial location in an era when their subsistence and cultural identity depend on mobility. This essentially results in alternatives to neoliberalism, which in fact actually replicate the top-down structures of political institutions without developing capacity at the local-community level (Ibid: 51).

Certainly, local resistance to neoliberalism is therefore clearly illustrated through the enviro-political, social, and economic systems.
of the Zapatista Movement. These sectors all have unique characteristics relating to land reform, education, health, and solidary economies, which distinguish them from neoliberal systems, such as those of the Mexican government. While weaknesses exist within these sectors, and the Zapatista Movement certainly is not without its challenges and limitations, the Movement has been critical in bringing attention to issues of Indigenous rights, fostering self-determination, and igniting uprisings internationally, in support of Indigenous peoples and alternatives to neoliberalism.

While there are those who believe that the EZLN and Sub-Commander Marcos are history, well-respected writers including Noam Chomsky, Immanuel Wallenstein and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, insist that the Zapatista Movement has been the most radical political initiative in the world, and perhaps the most important one, in recent times (Harvey 2014: 38).

As this “low-intensity war” continues in Mexico, whereby corruption, crime and drugs illustrate the state's lack of ability to effectively govern and ensure Indigenous peoples’ rights, Zapatista followers and members continue to resist the dominant forces and to incrementally liberate themselves from the confines of the neoliberal system (Harvey 2014: 2). Such examples are influential in mobilizing global efforts to find alternatives to neoliberalism.

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References—Bibliography


NB: do you have any comments on Gonzales’ article (peer-reviews anonymous and unpublished according to reviewers’ wishes)? Please send your comments to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org. Some of the comments we may publish as Critical Responses (maximum 3,000 words) in the next issue(s) of the journal. Extensive critical responses with source references may be published as full-fledged articles. Please supply your name, contact details, titles and affiliations, including your specialisms and any major publications.
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Dorsey's Column

Civilisationism versus the Nation State

James M. Dorsey

Edited remarks at Brookings roundtable in Doha. A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, iTunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn and Tumblr.

Introduction

Many have framed the battle lines in the geopolitics of the emerging new world order as the 21st century's Great Game. It is a game that aims to shape the creation of a new Eurasia-centred world, built on the likely fusion of Europe and Asia into what former Portuguese Europe minister Bruno Maçães calls a “supercontinent” (Maçães 2018). ¹

For now, the Great Game pits China together with Russia, Turkey and Iran against the United States, India, Japan and Australia. The two camps compete for influence, if not dominance, in a swath of land that stretches from the China Sea to the Atlantic coast of Europe.

The geopolitical flashpoints are multiple. They range from the China Sea to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Central European nations and, most recently, far beyond with Russia, China and Turkey supporting embattled Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

On one level, the rivalry resembles Risk, a popular game of diplomacy,
conflict and conquest played on a board depicting a political map of the earth, divided into forty-two territories, which are grouped into six continents. Multiple players command armies that seek to capture territories, engage in a complex dance as they strive for advantage, and seek to compensate for weaknesses. Players form opportunistic alliances that could change at any moment. Potential black swans threaten to disrupt.

The Rise of Civilisationism

Largely underrated in debates about the Great Game is the fact that increasingly there is a tacit meeting of the minds among world leaders as well as conservative and far-right politicians and activists that frames the rivalry: the rise of civilisationism and the civilisational state that seeks its legitimacy in a distinct civilisation rather than the nation state’s concept of territorial integrity, language and citizenry (Coker 2019).

The trend towards civilisationism benefits from the fact that 21st century autocracy and authoritarianism vests survival not only in repression of dissent and denial of freedom of expression, but also on maintaining at least some of the trappings of pluralism that can include representational bodies with no or severely limited powers, toothless opposition groups, government-controlled non-governmental organisations, and degrees of accountability (Kendall-Taylor & Erica Frantz 2015).

It creates the basis for an unspoken consensus on the values that
would underwrite a new world order on which men like Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Victor Orban, Mohammed bin Salman, Narendra Modi and Donald Trump find a degree of common ground. If anything, it is this tacit understanding that in the shaping of a new world order constitutes the greatest threat to liberal values such as human and minority rights.

By the same token, the tacit agreement on fundamental values reduces the Great Game—at least in the eyes of proponents of civilisationism—to a power struggle over spheres of influence and the sharing of the pie as well as a competition of political systems in which concepts such as democracy are hollowed out.

The Crisis and Looming Decline of the Liberal World Order

Intellectually, the concept of civilisationism puts into context much of what is currently happening. This includes the cyclical crises over the last decade as a result of a loss of confidence in leadership and the current world-order system; the rise of right and left-wing populism; the wave of Islamophobia and increased anti-Semitism; the apparent death of multi-culturalism with the brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as its most extreme expression; the Saudi and Russian alliance with ultra-conservative Christian groups in the West that propagate traditional family values; and Russian meddling in Western elections.

Analysts have explained these developments by pointing to a host of separate and disparate factors, some of which have been linked in
indistinct ways. Analysts pointed among others to the 2008 financial crisis, jihadist violence and the emergence of the Islamic State, the war in Syria, and a dashing of hope with the rollback of the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts. These developments, however, were and are at best accelerators—not sparks or initiators.

Similarly, analysts have believed that the brilliance of Osama Bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks on New York’s World Trade Towers and the Pentagon in Washington DC was the killing of multi-culturalism in one fell and brutal swoop. Few grasped at the time however just how consequential that would be. A significant eye-opener was the attack on the mosques in Christchurch in March 2019. New Zealand, much like Norway in the wake of the 22 July 2012 attacks by supremacist Anders Breivik, stands out as an anti-dote to civilisationism with its inclusive and compassionate response.

The Ill-Acknowledged Rise of the Alt-Right

The real eye-opener, however, was a New Zealand intelligence official who argued that New Zealand, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance alongside the United States, Britain, Australia and Canada, had missed the emergence of a far- or alt-right that created breeding grounds for violence because of Washington’s singular post-9/11 focus on what popularly is described as Islamic terrorism. That remark casts a whole different light on George W. Bush’s war on terror and the subsequent war against the Islamic State. Those wars are rooted as much in the response to 9/11, the 7/7 London attacks and other jihadist occurrences as they are in witting or unwitting civilisationism.
“The global war on terror has become a blueprint for violence against Muslims. When there isn’t a shooting at a mosque, there’s a drone strike in Somalia. When one Friday prayer goes by without incident, an innocent Muslim is detained on material support for terrorism charges or another is killed by law enforcement. Maybe a baby is added to a no-fly list,” said human rights activist Maha Hilal.⁶

Scholars Barbara Perry and Scott Poynting warned more than a decade ago in study of the fallout in Canada of the war on terror that “in declining adequately to recognize and to act against hate (crimes), and in actually modelling anti-Muslim bias by practicing discrimination and institutional racism through ‘‘ethnic targeting,’ ‘racial profiling,’ and the like, the state conveys a sort of ideological license to individuals, groups and institutions to perpetrate and perpetuate racial hatred”.⁷

The same is true for the various moves in Europe that have put women on the frontline of what in the West are termed cultural wars but in reality are civilisational wars involving efforts to ban conservative women’s dress and endeavours to create a European form of Islam. In that sense Victor Orban’s definition of Hungary as a Christian state in which there is no room for the other is the extreme expression of this trend. It is a scary picture, it raises the spectre of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations, yet it is everything but.

Fact is that economic and geopolitical interests are but part of the explanation for the erection of a near-total Muslim wall of silence when it comes to developments in Xinjiang⁸, the Organisation of
Islamic Countries’ ability to criticise the treatment of Muslim minorities in various parts of the world but praise China for its policy, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s alliance with a man like Victor Orban and his joining the right-wing chorus that has turned Jewish financier and philanthropist George Soros into a bogeyman, or the rise of militant, anti-Muslim Buddhism and Hinduism.

In fact, the signs of this were already visible with the alliance between Israel and the evangelists who believe in doomsday on the Day of Judgement if Jews fail to convert to Christianity, as well as the recent forging of ties between various powerful Islamic groups or countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the evangelist movement.  

Deconstructing and Debunking Civilisationism

Civilisationism is frequently based on myths erected on a falsification and rewriting of history to serve the autocrat or authoritarian's purpose. Men like Trump, Orban, and Erdogan project themselves as nationalist heroes who protect the nation from some invading horde. In his manifesto, Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the Christchurch attacks, bought into the notion of an illusionary invader. Muslims, he wrote in his The Great Replacement, “are the most despised group of invaders in the West, attacking them receives the greatest level of support”.

Tarrant also embraced the myths of an epic, centuries-long struggle between the white Christian West and Islam, with the defeat of the Ottomans in 1683 at the ports of Vienna as its peak.
Inscribed on Tarrant’s weapons were the names of Serbs who had fought the Ottomans as well as references to the battle of Vienna. To Tarrant, the Ottomans' defeat in Vienna symbolised the victory of the mythical notion of a world of inviolable, homogeneous nations. “The idea that (medieval societies) are this paragon of unblemished whiteness is just ridiculous. It would be hilarious if it weren't so awful,” said Paul Sturtevant, author of *The Middle Ages in the Popular Imagination* (Tauris, 2018).

Much like popular perception of the battle for Vienna, Tarrant’s view of history had little relation to reality. A multi-cultural empire, the Ottomans laid siege to Vienna in cooperation with Catholic French King Louis XIV and Hungarian Protestant noble Imre Thokoly as well as Ukrainian Cossacks. Vienna’s Habsburg rulers were supported not only by Polish armies but also Muslim Tartar horsemen. “The Battle of Vienna was a multicultural drama; an example of the complex and paradoxical twists of European history. There never has been such a thing as the united Christian armies of Europe,” said historian Dag Herbjørnsrud.

Literary scholar Ian Almond argues that notions of a clash of civilisations bear little resemblance to the “almost hopelessly complex web of shifting power-relations, feudal alliances, ethnic sympathies and historical grudges” that shaped much of European history (Almond 2008). “The fact remains that in the history of Europe, for hundreds of years, Muslims and Christians shared common cultures, spoke common languages, and did not necessarily see one another as ‘strange’ or ‘other,’” Almond said.
That was evident not only in the Battle of Vienna but also when the Ottomans and North Africa's Arab rulers rallied around Queen Elizabeth I of England after the Pope excommunicated her in 1570 for breaking with Catholicism and establishing a Protestant outpost. Elizabeth and her Muslim supporters argued that Protestantism and Islam were united in their rejection of idol worship, including Catholicism with its saints, shrines and relics.

In a letter in 1579 to Ottoman sultan Murad III, Elizabeth described herself as the “most mighty defender of the Christian faith against all kind of idolatries.” In doing so, she sought to capitalise on the fact that the Ottomans had justified their decision to grant Lutherans preferred commercial treatment on the basis of their shared beliefs.

Similarly, historian Marvin Powers challenges the projection of Chinese history as civilisational justification of the party leader's one-man rule by Xi Jinping (Powers 2019), as done by Fudan University international relations scholar Zhang Weiwei. Amazon’s blurb on Zhang’s bestselling *The China Wave: Rise of the Civilizational State* summarises the scholar’s rendition of Xi Jinping’s vision succinctly:

“China’s rise, according to Zhang, is not the rise of an ordinary country, but the rise of a different type of country, a country sui generis, a civilizational state, a new model of development and a new political discourse which indeed questions many of the Western assumptions about democracy, good governance and human rights.”

The civilisational state supposedly replaces western political ideas with
a model that traces its roots to Confucianism and meritocratic traditions.

In his sweeping study titled *China and England: The Preindustrial Struggle for Justice in Word and Image*, Powers demonstrates that Chinese history and culture is a testimony to advocacy of upholding individual rights, fair treatment, state responsibility to its people, and freedom of expression rather than civilisationism, hierarchy and authoritarianism (Powers 2019). 18

Powers extensively documents the work of influential Chinese philosophers, writers, poets, artists and statesmen dating back to the 3rd century BC who employed rational arguments to construct governance systems and take legal action in support of their advocacy. Powers noted that protection of free speech was embedded in edicts of the Han Emperor Wen in the second century BC. The edicts legitimised personal attacks on the emperor and encouraged taxpayers to expose government mistakes. The intellectuals and statesmen were the Chinese counterpart of contemporary liberal thinkers.

Utilising Civilisationism by autocrats—and Trump

Arab autocracies like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have stopped short of justifying their rule in civilisational terms but have enthusiastically embraced the civilisational state's rejection of Western notions of democracy and human rights. One could argue that Saudi Arabia's four-decade long global propagation of ultra-conservative strands of Islam or the UAE’s effort to mould an Islam...
that is apolitical and adheres to the principle of obedience to the ruler, are civilisational in nature.

Islamic law scholar Mohammed Fadel argues that one reason why Arab autocracies have not overtly embraced civilisationism even though they in many ways fit the mould, is the absence of a collective memory in post-Ottoman Arab lands. To explicitly embrace civilisationism as a concept, Arab states would have to cloak themselves in the civilisational mantle of either pan-Islam or pan-Arabism, which in turn would require regional integration.

One could argue that the attempt by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to impose their will on the Middle East, for example with the boycott of Qatar, is an attempt to create a basis for a regional integration that they would dominate.

In a lot of ways, Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church have understood the utility of civilisationism far better than others and made it work for them, certainly prior to the start of the Russian intervention in Syria in late September 2015. At a gathering several years before the intervention, Russia achieved a fete that seemed almost unthinkable. Russia brought to the same table at a gathering in Marrakech every stripe of Sunni and Shiite political Islam.

The purpose was not to foster dialogue among the various strands of political Islam. The purpose was to forge an alliance with a Russia that emphasised its civilisational roots in the Russian Orthodox Church and the common values it had with conservative and ultra-conservative Islam. To achieve its goal, Russia was represented at the gathering by
some of its most senior officials and prominent journalists whose belief systems were steeped in the values projected by the Church.

To the nodding heads of the participating Muslims, the Russians asserted that Western culture was in decline while non-Western culture was on the rise, that gays and gender equality threaten a woman's right to remain at home and serve her family, and that Iran and Saudi Arabia should be the model for women's rights. They argued that conservative Russian Orthodox values, just like the Shariah, offered a moral and ethical guideline that guarded against speculation and economic bubbles.

The US Trump Administration has embarked on a similar course by recently siding in the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women with proponents of ultra-conservative values such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq and several African countries. Together they sought to prevent the expansion of rights for girls, women, and LGBT people and weaken international support for the Beijing Declaration, a landmark 1995 agreement that stands as an internationally recognised progressive blueprint for women's rights.

The US position in the commission strokes with efforts by conservative Christians to reverse civilisational US courts decisions in favour of rights for women, minorities, members of the LGBT community, Muslims and immigrants and refugees. It is what conservative historian and foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan describes as the war within traditionally liberal society. It is that civilisational war that provides the rationale for Russian meddling in elections, a rationale
that goes beyond geopolitics. It also explains Trump's seeming empathy with Putin and other autocrats and authoritarians.

The US alignment with social conservatives contributes to the rise of the civilisational state. Putin's elevation of the position of the Orthodox Church and Xi's concentration of absolute power in the Communist Party strengthens institutions that symbolise the rejection of liberal values because they serve as vehicles that dictate what individuals should believe and how they should behave. These vehicles enable civilisationism by strengthening traditional hierarchies defined by birth, class, family and gender and deligitimising the rights of minorities and minority views.

The alignment suggests that the days are over when only a few dignitaries like Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov trumpeted that the West had lost "its monopoly on the globalization process" because there was a "market of ideas" in which different "value systems" were forced to compete.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Civilisational thinking within the West main threat to Liberal Democratic Order}

Conservative American author Christopher Caldwell asserts that Orban's civilisational concept of an authoritarian Christian democracy echoed the kind of democracy that "prevailed in the United States 60 years ago" prior to the civil rights movement and the 1968 student protests (Caldwell 2018).\textsuperscript{23}
Orban’s Hungary epitomises the opportunism that underlies the rise of the civilisational state as a mechanism to put one’s mark on the course of history and retain power. In Orban’s terms, civilisational means not Christianity as such but those Christian organisations that have bought into his authoritarian rule. Those that have not are being starved of state and public funding.  

Civilisationism’s increased currency is evident from Beijing to Washington DC with stops in between. Trump’s and his former strategy advisor Steve Bannon’s beef with China or Russia is not civilisational, it is about geopolitical and geo-economic power sharing. In terms of values, they think in equally civilisational terms.

In a speech in Warsaw in 2017, Trump declared that “the fundamental question of our time is whether the west has the will to survive” but assured his audience that “our civilization will triumph”. Bannon has established an “academy for the Judeo-Christian west” in a former monastery in the Italian town of Collepardo. The academy intends to groom the next generation of far-right populist politicians.

Therefore, initiatives like Bannon’s academy and the growing popularity of civilisational thinking in democracies, current and erstwhile, rather than in autocracies, contribute most significantly to an emerging trend that transcends traditional geopolitical dividing lines and sets the stage for the imposition of authoritarian values in an emerging new world order.

Interference in open and fair elections, support for far-right and ultra-conservative, family-value driven Western groups and influence
peddling on both sides of the Atlantic and in Eurasia at large by the likes of Russia, China and the Gulf states, serve the purpose of Bannon and his European associates.

_Civilisational thinking beyond the West still a major threat to Liberal Democratic Order_

Civilisationists have put in place the building blocks of a new world order rooted in their value system. These blocks include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that groups Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The grouping is centred on the Chinese principle of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of others—which amounts to support for the region’s autocratic regimes. The SCO’s Tashkent-based internal security coordination apparatus or Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), has similarly adopted China’s definition of the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism and separatism that justifies its brutal crackdown in Xinjiang.

Proponents of the civilisational state see the nation-state and Western dominance as an aberration of history. British author and journalist Martin Jacques and international relations scholar Jason Sharman argue that China’s history as a nation-state is at best 150 years old while its civilisational history dates back thousands of years.27

Similarly, intellectual supporters of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) project India as a Hindu-base civilisation rather than a multi-cultural nation-state. Modi’s minister of civil aviation, Jayant Sinha, suggests that at independence, India should have embraced its own culture

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instead of Western concepts of scientific rationalism. Talking to the Financial Times, Sinha preached cultural particularism. “In our view, heritage precedes the state... People feel their heritage is under siege. We have a faith-based view of the world versus the rational-scientific view”.  

Conclusion

The rise of the civilisational state with its corporatist traits raises the spectre of a new world order whose value system equates dissent with treason, views an independent press as the ‘enemy of the people’ and relegates minorities to the status of at best tolerated communities with no inherent rights. It is a value system that enabled Trump to undermine confidence in the media as the fourth estate that speaks truth to power, and has allowed the president and Fox News to turn the broadcaster into the United States' closest equivalent to state-controlled television. 

Trump’s portrayal of the media as the bogeyman has legitimised populist assaults on the press across the globe irrespective of political system from China and the Philippines to Turkey and Hungary. It has facilitated Saudi Prince Mohammed’s effort to fuse the kingdom's ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam with a nationalist sentiment that depicts critics as traitors rather than infidels.

In the final analysis, the tacit understanding on a civilisationism-based value system means that it concerns even the likes of New Zealand, Norway and perhaps Canada that are putting up their hands and saying
not me instead of me too. Perhaps Germany is one of the few countries that is seeking to stake out its place on a middle ground. The problem is that the ones that are not making their voices heard are the former bastions of liberalism like the United States and much of Europe. They increasingly are becoming part of the problem, not part of the solution.

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NB: do you have any comments on Dorsey’s article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitic.org or by contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.
Guest Column

The Upcoming Religiously motivated Civil War in Ukraine

Dionysios Bastas

Introduction

It has been well established, that we cannot fully grasp a situation while experiencing it from within it. In a very same way, human beings which are alive during pivotal points of history very often cannot grasp how critical their era really is.

It is a tragic attribute of humanity that many times, some historian fifty years or so later will be called to “appraise” and analyze how we got again to one more tragic episode on our journey as a species. The irony is that before a vessel hits an iceberg, it could have always simply altered its current course.

Today we are in the epicenter of such an era, whereby precisely the leadership and decision-making of a few, is bound to create bloody outcomes—and a subject of analysis for decades to come. The geographical region about which I wish to share my thoughts with you, is Ukraine. The religious context is that of Orthodox Christendom. The exact fact that today’s spark brings tomorrow's eruptions, is none other than the “hocus pocus” declaration of an Autocephalous “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (OCU).
The “trail” to the “Tomos of autocephaly” ¹ of 6 January 2019 is pretty much known: in April 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko (— for whom it is still insisted that he is a devotee of Uniate, the Eastern-rite Catholics that practically operates as the 5th column of the papacy within Orthodox populated countries) requested in written, the recognition and establishment of Autocephaly.

An obviously politically motivated request with elections in Ukraine imminent back at the time, but also a clear intervention on religious matters from a political institution. This practice reminds us of a Soviet era way of doing things, even worse than that, of a total despotic totalitarianism that many have hoped had eclipsed.

An escalating situation that should not have happened in the first place

On 11th October 2018 from the Phanar ² was announced, that there was the clear intention to grant Autocephaly and to re-establish Communion with schismatic ³ “priests” that not only were rejected by the vast majority of the Orthodox world, but still today are considered schismatic in the conscience and the everyday practices of the Orthodox Church (excluding the Phanar of course).

It seems insignificant that since the 1990s, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew himself had recognized Bishop Onufriy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) as the only recognized and accepted head Bishop, in the geographical region of Ukraine.
By December 2018, Poroshenko had announced that the so called “unification council” for the creation of the Autocephalous Ukrainian Church would be held on December 15th, letting be known that Patriarch Bartholomew had requested the three churches of Kiev to participate in this historical event.

Nonetheless, the Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) that never actually requested for autocephaly, after a direct order from Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev Onufriy has rejected even the idea of participation. In the end, only two bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) participated.

Already by December 7th, the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) had declared that the Patriarchate of Constantinopolis (Constantinople) has no validation to hold councils on Ukrainian soil and that because of the schismatic participants the unification council would be considered null and void.

Of course, the Moscow Patriarchate reacted on 14 September 2018 by suspending the liturgical prayerful commemoration of Patriarch Bartholomew, among other measures. Indicative of the continuous deterioration is the fact, that since 20 October 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarch has been named “schismatic” on comments made by the Metropolitan of Volokolamsk Hilarion.

All this has made many simple folks in the Orthodox world, with no “skin in the game” but who can grasp the severity of the situation, to “scratch their heads” and stare in bewilderment at the unfolding situation. Understandably there are also many, who are outside the
realms of faith and thus not just uninterested in the religious aspects of the matter but to whom all this seems meaningless details of “politicians’ investments”. Of course if someone wants to really see what political power in a spiritual garment really looks like, one should take a look at the Vatican, but we better let that matter for another time. After all, distinctions like these seem obsolete in modern ages like ours. Nonetheless, there are apparent effects, understandable even for someone who has only seen an Orthodox Temple on a Google Search.

Why it is wrong and disastrous that Autocephaly has been granted

The Phanar is operating under the claim, that it has every right to recall edicts that have been issued applied since the seventeenth century. These edicts were in essence about appointing the management of the Ukrainian Church under or through the Patriarchate of Moscow under certain obligations. Even if this claim can be taken seriously (which is highly debatable and with really valid points on the Moscow-held point of view), the Phanar argument remains childish (—if not rubbish—) and nobody seems to care to answer to the simple “why now?” question. In other words, “Who benefits from the choice of the exact time”?

It is of little importance if a right exists for someone to exercise it, compared with the consequences that come after the exercise of that right. We all have various rights to exercise but we normally do not exercise these as soon as we think of “what happens next”. It is called
better (—and not bitter—) judgement. In our everyday life, we can all think of situations where we refrain from exercising rights that we do have in order to promote common viability. In organized societies (as well as in big families) it is a primal condition to set aside one's personal ambition, vision or ego, and put these self-interests below the needs of the many.

One of the cornerstone pillars of the Orthodox Faith is the demotion of one's “rights” and the service to everybody else as a service towards Christ himself. That is because in the face of one’s fellow human being, we see a fellow creation of the Creator God.

All of these principles are well-known, even to a school child, and all of these suggest a much different way to handle things than what we actually witness. How is it then, that especially in Phanar, but also to a lesser extent (—at least on this topic—) in Moscow, they do not comprehend that not only they drive the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church of Christ in a maze that will make the crisis of past times look like a walk in the park, but also that they allow machinations of “this world”, that is of a secular worldview to run amok, to lead humanity away from where they always had gone to?

Trenches, blood and gore, horrors whereby one in the end one cannot discern perpetrators from victims, in the same way that in the final chapters of Orwell's Animal Farm one could not discern swine from men.

Whoever it might be, that has or has not the right to grant autocephaly in the region of Ukraine, the outcome of the current handlings will be
nothing else than the legitimization of multiple grave fractures and the creation of an “entity” hostile towards the already existing, Canonical and recognized Orthodox Church. This new “entity” will possess not only the willingness but also the backing of the State in question to carry out an abomination.

The dire consequences of having an “Ukrainian Orthodox Church”: a religiously motivated civil war

When there already has been openly expressed the intention that this new religious institution makes use of the name “Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, and the up to this day official Church be referred to as “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Patriarchate of Moscow”, what can we expect this usurpation to lead us?

When since 10 October 2018 Ukrainian President Poroshenko called on the Patriarchate of Moscow to leave Ukraine, what could one expect to happen next? When in Ukraine voices are already heard crying for the “retaking of our temples from the Russians” like Ukrainian citizens are calling other Ukrainian citizens, who is blind enough not to be able to see the religiously motivated civil war galloping towards realization?

And when the Ukrainian State has the backing of the “West” (—for the obvious geopolitical and military reasons, and with very frequent references made to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, as being one of the backstage players implicated in this whole case—) and shows a remarkable tolerance to the “grandchildren” of the Ukrainian SS of WW2, how optimistic is one entitled to be?
So an Ukrainian religious institution that has the backing of such a state, while it has the minority of parishes and an anemic acceptance in the Orthodox world, what exactly will it provide? If it has been founded on external influences and political ambitions—as appears to be the case—what exactly could we expect to happen, that it will now return to the path of fasting and prayer? Well, stranger things have happened, after all we people of Faith believe in miracles, so let us just wait and see how this plays out.

Eventfully though, when we will witness Ukrainian citizens, whose mother tongue is the Russian language and they identify themselves as of Russian heritage and their Worship needs are served by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), to be found under discrimination (—at best—) from their State, who will take the blame for the volatile situation?

Does anyone remember in what situation the Ukrainian citizens of Donbass found themselves before holding a referendum for their secession? And when finally, the situation degrades (—again—) to the point where differences are worked out through “bullet exchanging” who will be held responsible for the death toll, perhaps the Phanar?

Obviously if then the Russian Federation decides to operate on Ukrainian soil to protect the Russian minorities there, it will be labeled the “aggressor”, and if it will decide not to operate it will be portrayed as a “weak player” that cannot protect its “agents”.

It seems that whoever plays this game, is really into the usage of “horse-trading” and “double-barreled” questions directing to only
negative possible answers. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, that has not only the historical duty to spread the message of Logos incarnate Jesus Christ to this illogical world, but also the millennia-old experience of how to blossom under captivity, why does it let itself to become a pawn in a game dictated by others? At the very least, questions should be raised about the clarity of how the Church issues are managed today.

Whatever started with the “Pan-Orthodox Council” at Kolymbari in 2016, it continues to dismantle the spiritual unity of the Orthodox World. It is well-known that it takes “two to tango” but the biggest part of the responsibility always lies with the one who leads the “dance”.

The questionable role of Moscow in the escalating schism within the Orthodox world

Of course my Orthodox brothers in Moscow are not blameless. If they aspire to serve the Gospel by being the “Third Rome”, that can only be achieved in the spirit of Truth and not as a result of political, self-serving maneuvering and situation management.

The decision of the Patriarchate of Moscow not to participate in the Kolymbari Council, raised many eyebrows and it is thereby being constantly vindicated. But the decision has been justified with arguments based on technicalities and terms of diplomacy and not with showcasing the obvious.

That this was a council that from the beginning was political in nature
and as expected, did not resolve any of the open issues of the Orthodox world. A council that released texts, highly debatable ones that can be interpreted variously, in complete contradiction with the mindset showcased in the Gospel where one is obliged to “let your yes mean yes and no mean no”.

A council finally that was nothing more than a vessel to simply come closer to the various “Christian denominations” of the West, once again proving right all those that timely warned about this being the whole endgame all along.

A council that eventually all it achieved, was nothing else but to add a thorn in the body of the Church. But it is not enough to do what is right by simply being a capable and clairvoyant “skipper”. To inspire the Believers, so they can turn towards you for spiritual guidance, the course must be based on the proper motives. From that perspective many answers need to be given by Moscow circles.

Concluding thoughts

Of course in the Slavic “neighborhoods” of Orthodoxy, one can find more qualified people to “stand guard to the spiritual battlements” of their geographical region. After all, this text is written by a simple believer, who resides at the hot waters of the Mediterranean and there grows, experiences, questions and expects having immediate knowledge of his local circumstances.

And just allow me to point out that this text is not part of any “black propaganda” or “well paid article” like the Phanar accuses any voice of
critique. Of course accusations like that are just “mud in the wind”. This text is simply a result of Love for the Truth that although multifaceted, is always one.

Maybe after all, there is some ground to what is often mockingly asked in Moscow, when they refer to the Ecumenical Patriarch, by saying “where is his flock?” Perhaps that is the very reason why there must be this “miracle” of the establishment of this new religious institution in Kiev. And although we cannot have “new wine in old flasks” it seems we can have a new “church” with old “ingredients”. What good will come out of this for whoever is pulling the strings, remains to be seen, as soon as the cycle of violence resumes in the Ukraine and beyond.

How the Ecumenical Patriarch characterizes voices that oppose his will, is nothing but a misdemeanor if we ponder on the fact that the Patriarch himself, resorted to declare that “…whether our Russian brothers like it or not, sooner or later they will fall in line with the solution the Ecumenical Patriarchate will give, because they do not have another choice…”. Neither helped the statement that “…the Russian Church will regret this extreme decision…” on 13 October 2018 referring to the disruption of the Ecclesiastical Communion, charging practically Moscow with the responsibility for his own actions.

After all this, who can one blame, when the Phanar appears to have forgotten what “Primus inter Pares” means? Is that the ethos of a “tireless worker of the Gospel” as the Patriarch of Constantinopolis (Constantinople) has been named by peers of his? I wish that the only faulty part in the situation described, is my own (—inconsequential—) critique.
Yet do not think that everything written here is nothing more than a bundle of thoughts of one person. As soon as 17 September 2018, his Eminence the Metropolitan of Kithira Seraphim, as truly on watch, started raising the alarm for the possible outcome of this “obsession” as he described the persistence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the Ukrainian issue.

Of course this only makes it more pressing for the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece to be cautious when it finally is pressed to express its position in the matter. That way we will know if Metropolitan Seraphim spoke in vain and on deaf ears or not. After all, if someone is proved to be right, even on a few small matters, it would be prudent and wise to pay heed in his advice next time. After all by 20 October 2018, the Archbishop of Athens and whole Greece Hieronymus, has been briefed by the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill via postage—and so no one can claim that we “didn't know”.

And in the end if the practice that today is carried out by the Phanar becomes a common practice, how much time do we have until the day, when we see similar abominations in the sensitive area of Vardarska Banovina (formerly known as FYROM) with some other “autocephalous” church. For how long do we think that the storm will be raging somewhere far from here?

Throughout the (—falling—) continuation of this history, things could have gone different. On 31 December 2018 Patriarch Kirill, once again sent a letter to the Phanar, calling for Patriarch Bartholomew even in the last minute to reconsider and withdraw from this “political adventure”—but in vain.
It seems to be imperative, on the pretext of safeguarding religious unity in Ukraine from external interventions “made in Moscow”, to drive Kiev to external interventions “made in Constantinopolis”. After all, whoever takes some time to read the first page of the Charter of fundamental rights of this new “church”, that already saw the light on 5 December 2018, will see that the model of operation mirrors that of the church of Crete which has autonomy and not autocephaly, with whatever that might mean for the supposed safeguard against external interventions.

After one schism ... many more to come. But human beings that have been appointed to manage the human affairs of the Godly installed organization, that we call Church, should keep in mind, regardless of geography, something that has been written a long time ago by St. John Chrysostomos, that “a schism cannot be washed away from one’s record, not even with the blood of martyrdom”.

In the end if my above writings are just the outcome of erroneous judgement, St John's lines were still the outcome of the influence of the Holy Spirit. Of course one can argue that if it could at least be remembered that “God not all anoints as bishops but through all acts” perhaps priests would not compete in arrogance even with us of the flock.

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Endnotes

1. “Tomos of Autocephaly”: Practically a decree of self-governance that allows the head Bishop not to have to report to any higher bishop.

2. “Phanar”: Usually referred to with the modern term “Fener”, in the same way that Constantinopolis (Constantinople) is referred to as “Istanbul”.

3. “Schismatic”: A person who creates or incites schism in an organization or who is a member of a splinter group; the offence of schism concerns not differences of belief or doctrine but promotion of division.

NB: do you have any comments on Bastas’ article? Please send these to info@ethnogeopolitics.org, or through the contact form at www.ethnogeopolitics.org.

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The Mayflower Bookshop in Leiden (www.themayflowerbookshop.nl) moved the nicest bookstore in Holland from Hogewoerd 107 to Breestraat 65 in 2015 in order to expand its repository. In 2016 it moved to Breestraat 142.

Breestraat 142 (© Mayflower 2016)
Now second, revised Dutch edition:

Military intelligence scandal uncovered in Dutch book

A general sporting three stars on his uniform, commissioning a private spy to nose around in a commercial company. And this is not just anyone: it’s the general’s own wife. A tribal war within the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, with unsuspecting citizens being victimized. One would expect such a modus operandi in North Korea, not in the Low Countries. However, this is what author Edwin F. Giltay experienced — he vividly describes the saga in *The Cover-up General* (Dutch: *De doofpotgeneraal*).

In his book Mr. Giltay depicts the rather transparent conduct of secret service agents infiltrating at the internet provider where he was assigned. Initially a spook tried to recruit Mr. Giltay as a military analyst. At the same time however, she herself was being monitored. At the root of this tug-of-war within the Military Intelligence Service was the infamous film roll of Srebrenica depicting war crimes, which was misdeveloped by the Dutch Armed Forces. The recruiting officer intended to make public the footage on the film wasn’t at all lost — information that would no doubt have undermined the standing of a certain triple-star general.

*The Cover-up General* delineates this espionage scandal fervently. Mr. Giltay recounts the absurd consequences in great detail.

In November 2014, *The Cover-up General* was published in Amsterdam. One year after publication — when it was already sold out — the book was banned. A judge prohibited Edwin F. Giltay to reprint, distribute and even promote his book. The censorship verdict was front page news in the Balkans, and met with anger and disbelief everywhere.

However, the verdict was resolutely overturned on 12 April 2016. A second, revised edition of *The Cover-up General* by Blauwe Tijger Publishing returned on the market in September 2016.

www.thecoverupgeneral.com

*The Court rules the accuracy by which Edwin Giltay wrote the book, is not in doubt*

Court of Appeal The Hague

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